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Since the first report in this series was published in July 2008, 
gun and knife crime has stubbornly remained in the headlines – 
and on the political agenda. Murder is always shocking; never 
more so than when both perpetrator and victim are young. 
Twenty-seven people were killed as a result of gun and knife 
crime on London’s streets in 2008 and 380 people in England 
and Wales as a whole. And there is a wider economic cost to 
this human loss. The economic cost of all murders with firearms 
amounted to more than £200 million. When murders with knives 
are included, the cost is approximately £628 million. The number 
of knife murders has increased by 23% over the past ten years; 
injuries caused by knives have increased by 30% from 1997, 
and police arrests for carrying a weapon with a blade or point 
in and near schools went up 500% from 1999 to 2005. Culprits 
are younger, and the fear that they spread is driving more young 
people to carry knives for self-protection.
 
Injuries and deaths from knives far outstrip those from firearms: 
knife crimes are four times more common than gun crimes; and 
the risk of serious injury is more than double that for gun crime. 
Guns are strictly regulated but restricting the supply of knives is 
impossible. So, what should the Government do?
 
Dr Bob Golding and Jonathan McClory build on the findings of 
their first report, and discuss four case studies from international 
cities that have successfully reduced violent gun and knife 
crime.
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Executive Summary
Since the first report in this series was pub-
lished in July 2008, gun and knife crime
has stubbornly remained in the headlines –
and on the political agenda. Murder is
always shocking; never more so than when
both perpetrator and victim are young.
Twenty-seven people were killed as a result
of gun and knife crime on London’s streets
in 2008 and 380 people in England and
Wales as a whole. And there is a wider eco-
nomic cost to this human loss. The eco-
nomic cost of all murders with firearms
amounted to more than £200 million.
When murders with knives are included,
the cost is approximately £628 million.1
The number of knife murders has
increased by 23% over the past ten years;
injuries caused by knives have increased by
30% from 1997, and police arrests for car-
rying a weapon with a blade or point in
and near schools went up 500% from
1999 to 2005. Culprits are younger, and
the fear that they spread is driving more
young people to carry knives for self-pro-
tection. Injuries and deaths from knives far
outstrip those from firearms: knife crimes
are four times more common than gun
crimes; and the risk of serious injury is
more than double that for gun crime.
Guns are strictly regulated but restricting
the supply of knives is impossible.
At the heart of this report is a study of
four cities – Toronto, Chicago, Boston and
Amsterdam – which have successfully dealt
with surges in gun and knife crime. The
scale of their impact is astonishing: violent
crime in Boston is half the level experi-
enced in the 1990; Chicago reduced their
homicide rate by nearly 40% between
1998 and 2007; Toronto has seen the same
drop off in violence since 2005. Lessons
from work in these cities have helped the
research team identify issues which require
immediate attention in England and
Wales.
Problems
Poor intelligence. Poor intelligence and infor-
mation sharing between schools and police is
a pervasive problem throughout England and
Wales. Many school administrators fear that
their school will be stigmatised if the police
get involved. Although police have a presence
in some London secondary schools, this
should be only a first step towards more far-
reaching prevention work in schools. In
Boston, where police have been embedded in
at-risk primary schools, they have been able
to intervene before violence erupts.
Weak international agreements on gun
control and supply that do not involve the
Home Office and police. Cross-departmen-
tal co-operation can fail in any realm of
government policy; this has been true of
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
and the Home Office when it comes to
combating the illicit international arms
trade.
Unclear domestic legislation. Interviews
have confirmed the position taken in our
first report, Going Ballistic, that current
legislation governing firearms and offen-
sive weapons is piecemeal and incomplete
– in short, not fit for purpose.
Gangs taking over areas. Gangs and high-
risk individuals can create virtual “no-go”
areas, where residents fear for their safety.
Without the power to impose carefully tar-
geted civil injunctions, gang activity can
destroy civilised living conditions for some
communities.
www.policyexchange.org.uk • 5
1 In England and Wales the total
social and economic cost of a
murder is estimated to be
£1,662,500 (see Chapter 1)
“ Experience from home and abroad demonstrates that
interventions are critically dependent on the collaboration
of partners”
No co-ordinated approach to outreach
work. Outreach work in high-risk areas of
England and Wales, although good as far
as it goes, would be more effective if it were
fully co-ordinated and if the relationship
between police and qualified outreach
workers were better defined. Experience
from abroad demonstrates that interven-
tions are critically dependent on the col-
laboration of partners; the strength of part-
nerships and the sustainability of these
arrangements is a real concern.
Missed opportunities for intervention.
Victims of violent crime are up to 70%
more likely to become violent assailants
themselves, but there is no national pro-
gramme in place to offer trauma support
and follow-up counselling to victims who
receive hospital treatment.2 Hospital treat-
ment for victims of violent crime should be
a point of intervention to curb the likeli-
hood of future violence.
Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements
are not used appropriately. Multi-agency
Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs)
were designed to manage and monitor sex
offenders after release from prison. However,
they have wider potential. MAPPAs should
be used to target gun and knife crime offend-
ers, who also pose a risk to society.
Solutions
Toughening sentences and simplifying the
criminal justice system are just two of the
many tools available to policymakers. The
authors argue that more attention should
be given to the underlying social and eco-
nomic factors that drive young people to
carry weapons and to get involved with
gangs: the public health approach.
Interventions must occur with younger age
groups than they might have done 20 years
ago. Early engagement and support for
vulnerable families and individuals, and
information sharing between police pro-
tective services and other agencies are
essential.
Given the difficulty of measuring knife
crime, policymakers need access to every
possible source of data. The police are not
given unfettered access to data and infor-
mation about individual victims of violent
crime receiving hospital treatment.
Children and youths treated for gun and
knife violence should receive counselling
from an outreach worker while in hospital,
with follow-up after discharge. Successful
programmes of action in Boston, Chicago
and Toronto have one thing in common:
practitioners and policymakers have
understood that working with other organ-
isations to reduce the demand for guns and
knives over a number of years is the only
way to turn the tide of youth violence.
The Government’s most recent attempts
to reduce gun and knife crime, the tackling
guns action plan (TGAP) and the tackling
knives action plan (TKAP) show promise.
These employ both long-term diversionary
measures and short-term suppression
measures to take weapons off the streets.
According to senior police sources, the
early results of the tackling knives plan are
positive. However, its funding expires at
the end of March 2009, while the problem
of knife crime will not. The positive steps
taken under both action plans must be
made permanent. The Government will
never solve the problem of violent gun and
knife crime through a one-year initiative; it
will require a generation of work.
The authors’ recommendations centre
on addressing the risk factors associated
with violence and establishing practical
intervention and prevention programmes.
The full list of 20 recommendations can be
found on page 56. The following are the
most important:
Deploy police to primary and secondary
schools. Police forces in large conurbations
should provide dedicated police officers for
at-risk risk primary and secondary schools,
Getting to the Point
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2 Interview with senior represen-
tative, Metropolitan Police,
London, October 2008
and further education colleges. Police
should have a role in delivering an anti-
violence curriculum in co-operation with
students. Embedding police officers in
schools is vital for identifying at-risk chil-
dren and youths at the earliest possible age,
and channelling them into available
resources and services.
Develop an anti-violence curriculum. The
Department for Children, Schools and
Families should – in partnership with
other government departments – develop
good practice guidelines for an anti-vio-
lence curriculum in primary and secondary
schools.
Pass legislation to allow police to ban cer-
tain individuals from specific locations. A
law is required to enable police to ban
high-risk individuals from specific areas for
a specified period of time. Birmingham’s
use of Section 222 of the Local
Government Act 1972 allowed police and
councils to combat gang activity and avert
potential violence until this practice was
banned. Simpler, more practical and time-
ly powers have been used to good effect in
Amsterdam.
Share information from A&E depart-
ments. The Department of Health should
produce guidelines instructing hospitals to
share information on A&E patients treated
for violent crime with the police service.
Stabbings should be reported in the same
way as gunshot wounds.
Use hospital and prison as a point for inter-
vention. When victims or offenders pres-
ent themselves to the health service or
criminal justice system, there is an oppor-
tunity to intervene and reduce the risks of
further violence. Hospitals should offer
psychological trauma assessment and fol-
low-up counselling services. Prisons need
to provide bespoke intervention pro-
grammes for gun and knife offenders.
This publication provides an updated
account of best practice in the reduction of
violent crime abroad. It also discusses how
co-operation and co-ordination interna-
tionally could limited the supply of
firearms. But why have policies that have
been shown to work not been implement-
ed in England and Wales? The authors
believe that institutional structures in both
national and local government hinder
effective multi-agency strategy to reduce
violent crime. The setting up of crime and
disorder reduction partnerships in 1998
was an encouraging development, but
interviews with senior police officers
revealed that some agencies are reluctant
participants, which is not helped by a lack
of clear lines of accountability for partici-
pants. This means that multi-agency work
on violent crime reduction is not occurring
as it should. Although outside the scope of
this report, the authors feel there is an
urgent need for further research into gov-
ernance and accountability arrangements
of agencies and local authorities at a local
level.
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Introduction 
Firearms in England and Wales
Going Ballistic, the first report in this
series, explored the extent of gun, gang and
knife crime in England and Wales. Based
on primary research from surveys and
interviews with police constables, youth
offending team managers, young offenders
and public polling, the report revealed a
significant gap between official crime sta-
tistics on gun and knife crime and the real-
ity experienced on the street. This second
report focuses on the lessons that policy-
makers can learn from abroad on how to
tackle gun and knife crime effectively. 
Gun crime is relatively rare in the UK
and is concentrated in urban areas with
high levels of social exclusion and econom-
ic deprivation. Most recorded gun crime is
committed with real or replica guns, or air
weapons. Knives and sharp instruments are
the most common murder weapons in
England and Wales, accounting for rough-
ly one third of all homicides.3 Rates of
murder and serious violence in England
and Wales fall midway between those of
similarly developed societies. 
Crime Statistics in England and Wales
Establishing a clear picture of the state of
gun and knife crime in England and Wales
is a challenging task given the disparate
and often conflicting sources of data.
These range from official statistics (the
British Crime Survey and police recorded
crime), to secure sources (criminal intelli-
gence maintained by law enforcement
agencies).4 However published statistics
need to be interpreted with care: non-
reporting and non-recording of incidents
mean that recorded crime figures do not
and cannot include all crimes committed,
as demonstrated in Figure 1.5 Additionally,
the British Crime Survey (BCS) does not
wholly represent the reality of society’s
experience of crime.6,7 Changes in police
recording practices – notably to the count-
ing rules in 1998 and the introduction of
the national crime recording standard in
2002 – have led to artificial shifts in vio-
lent crime statistics.8,9
According to the British Crime Survey,
overall levels of crime fell by a third
between 1997 and 2007.10 But, according
to police recorded crime statistics, serious
violent offences increased by 35% in the
same period.11
Gun Crime Statistics
Statistics on firearms offences show a long-
term upward trend over the past ten years
with a fall over the past two years. Firearms
(excluding air weapons) were reported to
8
3 Squires P et al, Street
Weapons Commission: Guns,
Knives, and Street Violence,
London: Centre for Crime and
Justice Studies, 2008
4 Glasgow sometimes dubbed
the ‘knife crime capital of
Europe’, has (according to the
World Health Organisation) the
highest murder rate in Europe.
Although overall levels of crime
have fallen in the west of
Scotland, levels of violent crime,
in particular knife crime, have
remained relatively constant for
the last 40 years
5 Hayden C, Hales G, Lewis S
and Silverstone D, “Young men
convicted of firearms offences in
England and Wales: an explo-
ration of family and educational
opportunities for prevention”,
Policy Studies, 29:2, 163 –178,
2008
6 Squires P et al op cit
7 Golding B and McClory J,
Going Ballistic, London: Policy
Exchange, 2008
8 Simmons J, Legg C and
Hoskins R, National Crime
Recording Standard (NCRS): an
analysis of the impact on
recorded crime. Part One: the
national picture, Home Office,
online report 2003; see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs
2/hors254.pdf
9 Coleman C, Hird C and Povey
D, op cit, p12
10 The BCS has been problem-
atic since its inception, as it
does not include victims under
the age of 16. According to evi-
dence from police and youth
offending team workers, under-
16s are experiencing more vio-
lence than before. The Home
Office has announced plans to
include under-16s in future
British Crime Surveys, although
it remains to be seen how effec-
tively they will be able to meas-
ure under-16 victimisation rates.
11 Nicholas S, Kershaw C and
Walker A, Crime in England and
Wales 2006/07, London: Home
Office, Table 2.01, 2007
Deaths
Reported 
Assault Injury 
Threats
Unreported 
Assault Injury 
Threats
Figure 1: Relationship between
reported and unreported crime
have been used in 9,650 recorded crimes in
2006-07. For all firearms offences (exclud-
ing air weapons) there was a 4% increase to
the year ending December 2007.12
Offences involving imitation weapons
totalled 2,517 in 2006-07, a 23% reduc-
tion on the previous year and handgun
offences decreased by 11% to 4,175.13,14
Figures for gun-related homicides and
attempted homicides are arguably more
reliably reported than crimes that result in
less serious injury. In total, there were 750
in 1997-98 and 1,456 in 2004-05.15 They
have since fallen, but at 818 for 2006-07,
remain above their pre-1998 level.16 A
2005 study found people thought that
although the most serious gun crime had
fallen in the short term, less serious inci-
dents, such as street robbery with a
firearm, had increased.17 The reasons
behind this sentiment could be twofold:
first, people may have been more inclined
to report incidents, second, there has been
an increase in the use of “undischarged”
firearms or replicas.18 Table 1 shows total
injuries and fatalities from firearms from
1998 to 2005.
Knife Crime Statistics
According to the British Crime Survey, lev-
els of knife crime have remained fairly sta-
ble at around 6-7% of all violent crime.19
Knives and sharp instruments are the most
common method of killing in England and
Wales, accounting for roughly one third of
www.policyexchange.org.uk •   9
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12 Home Office Statistics,
Connected, Crime in England
and Wales 2007/08,
www.connected.gov.uk/facts/gu
ncrime/index.html 
13 Kaiz P, “Homicides, recorded
crimes involving firearms”, in
Povey D et al (eds), Homicides,
Firearm Offences and Intimate
Violence 2006/07
(Supplementary Volume 2 to
Crime in England and Wales
2006/07), 31 January 2008,
Home Office online report 03/08;
see
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs
08/hosb0308.pdf
14 Golding R and McClory J, op
cit 
15 Hales G, Lewis C, Silverstone
D, Gun Crime: the market in and
use of illegal firearms, Home
Ofice Research Study 298, pp 3-
4, 2006
16 Kaiz P, op cit 
17 Povey D and Kaiz P,
“Recorded Crimes Involving
Firearms”, Chapter 2 in Povey D
et al, op cit, p 39
18 Interview with ACPO Criminal
Use of Firearms working group
representative, May 2008
19 Problems with the construc-
tion of the BCS survey sample
(specifically the exclusion of
those aged under 16, under-
reporting of less serious knife
injuries by victims and the BCS
focus on national average rates
of victimisation) may be respon-
sible for obscuring the relevant
trends
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Figure 2: National violence index: trends in police recorded violence and
BCS reports of violent offenders
Figure 3: Crime recorded by the police in which firearms were reported to have
been used as principal weapon, England and Wales, 1998-99 to 2006-07
all homicides.20 Murders involving knives
or other sharp instruments increased by
28% from 1997 to 2007.21
In the past, police have not recorded
knife crime as a separate offence, recording
violence by the scale and type of the injury
(GBH, wounding) not by the weapon
used. It was only after the National Audit
Office report, Reducing the Risk of Violent
Crime, in February 2008 criticised the
availability of police data regarding
weapon use that knife crime data came to
be recorded separately. And because official
knife crime figures have been collected for
only one year, there is no way to identify
any trends in police recorded statistics.
However, various reporting sources can be
used to discern a clearer picture of knife
crime. 
There are three sources of data that
point to an increase in knife carrying.
Although potentially ambiguous on their
own, when taken together they indicate a
definite increase over the last ten years. The
first of these sources is “self-reporting” sur-
veys of young people, which suggest a
steady rise in instances of knife carrying.
The second source is police data, which
shows that more people are being charged
with carrying a weapon in a public place.
Finally, data from hospital accident and
emergency departments shows that more
people are receiving treatment for stab
wounds.22
In a series of self-reporting surveys car-
ried out by MORI on behalf of the Youth
Justice Board, a steady rise in the propor-
tion of youths carrying knives was
observed: in 2002, 20% of schoolchildren
interviewed said that they had carried a
knife at some point during the previous 12
months; in 2005, it was 32%.23
Meanwhile, recorded offences for weapons
possession (having an article with a blade
or a point in a public place) increased over-
all by 66% from 1999 to 2005.24
Possession of an offensive weapon without
a “reasonable excuse” increased by 30%
over the same period.25 In and around
schools the problem has increased fivefold;
arrests for having an article with a blade or
point on school premises increased 500%
from 1999 to 2005.
The growth in weapon offences could
be explained by the police taking a more
proactive approach to weapons carrying.
However, hospital accident and emergency
departments have also reported a substan-
tial increase in the number of patients
receiving treatment for stab wounds. A
Getting to the Point
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20 Squires, P et al, op cit
21 Coleman C, Hird C and
Povey D, op cit 
22 Squires, P. et al, op cit
23 Philips, A and Chamberlain V,
MORI Youth Survey 2006,
London; Youth Justice Board for
England and Wales, 2006
24 Ibid
25 Ibid
Table 1: Recorded offences involving use of a firearm in England and Wales where injury was
caused, by degree of injury, 1998-99 to 2001-05
Year Non-air weapons Air weapons Total
Total Fatal Serious Slight Total Fatal Serious Slight 
injury injury* injury injury injury injury
1998/99 864 49 162 653 1,514 0 133 1,381 2,378
1999/00 1,195 62 200 933 1,977 0 171 1,806 3,172
2000/01 1,382 72 244 1,066 1,821 1 166 1,654 3,203
2001/02 1,877 95 392 1,390 1,915 2 165 1,748 3,792
2002/03 2,179 80 416 1,683 2,377 1 156 2,220 4,556
2003/04 2,367 68 437 1,862 2,395 0 157 2,238 4,762
2004/05 3,856 77 410 3,369 1,502 1 143 1,358 5,358
Source: Table 3b in Povey and Katza (2006: 76) in Coleman et al. (2006) HOSB 02/06.
* A serious injury is one which necessitated detention in hospital or involved fractures, concussion, severe general shock, penetration by a bullet or mulitiple shot wounds.
2006 study of A&E departments found
that the number of people admitted as a
result of stab or sharp instrument injuries
rose by 30% from 1997 to 2005.26,27,28
Figure 4 shows the increase in hospital
admissions for knife wounds from 2002 to
2007.
Firearms in an international perspective
In 1996, the World Health Organisation
(WHO) declared violence a growing pub-
lic health problem, and has more recently
classified violence as a “pandemic”.29 There
are parts of the world where this seems an
apt description, as Table 2 shows.
The WHO has estimated that there are
about 2.3 million annual deaths globally
due to violence, and 460,000 of those
deaths are a result of firearms.30, 31 In Going
Ballistic we observed that “the bulk of
research on gun crime concludes that more
guns do indeed mean more crime and that
countries with higher gun ownership rates
have higher rates of homicide, injury and
suicide involving firearms”.32 For example,
in 2003 in the US there were 11,700 gun
homicides (a rate of 4.0 per 100,000 pop-
www.policyexchange.org.uk • 11
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26 Konig T and Knowles C,
“Stabbing: data support public
perception”, British Medical
Journal, 2006
27 Anecdotal evidence provided
in the Police Federation submis-
sion to the Home Affairs Select
Committee in 2007 backed this
up: “The prevalence of knives on
the streets has undoubtedly
increased over the years. Police
officers not only have to assist
victims of knife crime but are all
too often victims themselves:
28% of police officers have been
threatened by a knife on at least
one occasion in the last two
years.”
28 Police Federation,
“Memorandum submitted to the
Select Committee on Home
Affairs – knife crime”, House of
Commons: Hansard Archives
Research, 200
29 Krug E et al (eds), World
Report on Violence and Health:
Summary, Geneva, Switzerland:
World Health Organization, 2002
30 966,000 of these deaths are
the result of suicides, 874,000
are homicides and 596,000 are
war related. The annual death
toll occurring in non-conflict
areas as a result of firearms is
estimated at 200,000
31 Cukier W and Sidel V, op cit
32 Golding B and McClory J, op
cit, p14
33 Miller, T and Cohen M,
“Costs of Gunshot and Cut Stab
Wounds in the United States
with some Canadian
Comparisons”, Accident
Analysis and Prevention, vol 29,
no 3, 1997, pp 329-341 (adjust-
ed for 2007 inflation)
34 Miller, T. and Cohen, M., op
cit
35 Cukier W and Sidel V, The
Global Gun Epidemic, London:
Praeger Security International,
2006
36 Interview with West Midlands
BCU Commander, April 2008
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Figure 4: Hospital admissions for knife wounds, HES Online
Economic cost of violence
The cost of gun crime, a somewhat crude measure of the destructive capacity of violence, has been
researched by economists. In the US, the direct costs to the police service of a fatal gunshot have been
estimated at more than $40,000.33 These costs include police and emergency services’ time, as well as the
cost of investigation. Other studies have included the indirect costs associated with firearms deaths.
Although the value-of-life measurement differs across studies, one estimates the cost of a fatal gunshot at
$2.8 million, factoring in a lifetime of wages, and a non-fatal gunshot wound at $249,000.34
Firearms-related damage has been estimated to cost $195 a person a year in Canada and $495 a
person a year in the US. The total cost of firearms death and injury in Canada is estimated at $6.6
billion.35 In the UK, the cost of a non-fatal gunshot wound is estimated to be £110,000.36
In England and Wales the Home Office estimates the total social and economic cost of a murder
is £1,662,500 (inflation adjusted), making the cost of all murders with firearms in 2006-07 more
than £200 million. When the number of murders with knives (258 in 2006-07) is included the cost
rises to approximately £628 million. This figure does not include the costs of non-fatal assaults or
injury with guns or knives.
ulation). In Canada, there were 161 gun
homicides (a rate of 0.5 per 100,000).
Figure 5 shows the firearms ownership
rates compared to the rate of firearms
deaths in 20 high-income countries.
The intention of legislative controls is,
of course, to reduce gun use in crime by
restricting supply and thus make it more
difficult, time consuming or costly for a
criminal or potential criminal to obtain a
firearm.37
Although it is often said (in the context
of regulatory regimes) that deaths or
injuries caused by the use of firearms is rel-
atively small (they represent 0.4% of all
recorded crime in England and Wales),
their impact is nevertheless considerable.
For example, in Germany only 0.25% of
all crime involved a firearm.38 But this rep-
resents 16,411 cases where firearms were
used to threaten 10,883 times and were
fired 5,528 times – a considerable number
even allowing for the size of Germany.39
Additionally, gun use can have an impact
on community safety and confidence gen-
erally, as we have seen in parts of London
or other large cities in Britain. A report in
The New York Times recently drew atten-
tion to a drastic increase in the deaths of
young people from gun crime in major US
cities, affecting the safety of whole com-
munities and areas.40
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Table 2: Countries with the highest rates of reported firarms deaths
Country Year Total firearm Total firearm Gun homicide Gun suicide Accidental Undetermined Percent of Percent of
deaths death rate rate rate firearm death rate homicides firearm
(minimum) (minimum) death rate with firearms deaths that
are homicides
1 Colombia 2002 22827 55.7 51.8 86 93
2 Venezuela 2000 5689 34.3 22.15 1.16 0.42 10.57 67 95
3 South Africa 2002 11709 26.8 26.1 54 97
4 El Salvador 2001 1641 25.8 25.3 71 98
5 Brazil 2002 38088 21.72 19.54 0.78 0.18 1.22 64 97
6 Pueto Rico 2001 734 19.12 17.36 1.17 0.49 0.1 91 91
7 Jamaica 1997 450 18.6 18.2 0.37 58 98
8 Guatemala 2000 2109 18.5
9 Honduras 1999 1677 16.2 16.2
10 Uruguay 2000 104 13.91 3.11 7.18 3.53 0.09 63 22
11 Ecuador 2000 1321 13.39 10.73 0.77 0.25 1.63 68 22
12 Argentina 2001 371 11.49 4.34 2.88 0.64 3.63 70 38
13 USA 2001 29753 10.27 3.98 5.92 0.28 0.08 64 38
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Figure 5: International firearms deaths per 100,000
Turning to Western Europe, Switzerland
has one of the highest rates of gun owner-
ship and a high rate of firearms deaths
compared to other Western European
countries, where it tops the league table
with 6.4 firearms deaths per 100,000 peo-
ple.41 France also has a relatively high rate
of gun ownership – an estimated 18.2% of
households own a firearm. Although
detailed firearms death and injury rates are
not available for France, it has the third
highest firearms homicide rate in Europe.42
However, many countries within
Western Europe have imposed strict regu-
lation of firearms, perhaps because of the
experience of war – epitomised by multi-
national agreements which followed the
Second World War.43 As a result the rates of
firearms deaths in Europe vary significant-
ly. (In all European countries for which
data is available suicides account for the
largest percentage of firearms deaths.) 
Germany, for example, has had a rela-
tively strict regime since legislation was
introduced in 1972 in response to domes-
tic terrorism. The law states that “the num-
ber of gun owners and the number of types
of privately held guns must be limited to
the lowest possible level in the light of the
interests of public safety”.44 Licensing in
Germany requires certification of need,
certification of trustworthiness, certifica-
tion of technical knowledge and certifica-
tion of physical fitness. Carrying a weapon
is reserved for those who can demonstrate
that their life is in acute danger, and gun
owners must have been citizens or resi-
dents of the country for at least three
years.45
The Netherlands also operates a strict
regulatory regime and its firearms homi-
cides are low. To own a gun you must be
over 18 and a member of a nationally
licensed gun club for at least a year.
Licence applications are approved by the
police, licences must be renewed annually
and firearms registered. Automatic and
semi-automatic weapons are banned. In
2006 further rules were introduced to
make gun ownership stricter and revoca-
tion easier – including for committing a
crime and “moving in criminal circles”.46
Australia and Canada have also regis-
tered significant declines in forms of gun
violence targeted by legislation; however,
the impact of domestic gun laws in Canada
are thought to be undermined by the flow
of illegal firearms from the US.47
Structure of Report
This report addresses the question of how
to reduce gun crime and knife crime in
England and Wales from two angles:
demand and supply. Chapter 2 examines
the demand side of the issue. This is devel-
oped in Chapter 3, the heart of the report,
which analyses how four cities – Boston,
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Comparing gun crime in the United States and Canada
The number of robberies without firearms is quite similar in both countries: 74 per 100,000 in
Canada and 87 per 100,000 people in America. But The US has the highest rates of firearms crime
in the developed world: 40% of its more than 400,000 robberies a year involve firearms, and there
are 62 victims of armed robberies per 100,000 people.48 In Canada 14.6% of 21,751 robberies in
2001 involved firearms, and 14 victims of armed robberies per 100,000 people.49
Despite a dramatic decline in crime during the 1990s America still has a homicide rate that is
about four times greater than England and Wales (FBI, 2005; Cotton and Bibi, 2005). The differ-
ence is largely accounted for by gun homicides because firearms are involved in 70% of all American
homicides but less than 10% of those in England and Wales.
Toronto, Chicago and Amsterdam – have
dealt with guns and knives. This chapter is
divided into sections on police tactics, edu-
cational programmes and police involve-
ment in schools, social and outreach work,
providing opportunities for youth, devel-
oping a multi-agency approach, communi-
ty engagement, and offender management.
We argue that a multifaceted system of
prevention, intervention, and suppression
is the only way to combat rising levels of
gun and knife violence effectively. 
In the long term, prevention is the best
solution but, in the short term, interven-
tion and targeted suppression tactics must
be put in place. Because a great deal of vio-
lent crime goes unreported, policymakers
must also focus efforts and resources on
reducing the rates of victimisation. We
look at policies that have worked in
Canada and the four case study cities.
Chapter 4, on the supply side, looks at
the international context of the illicit
firearms trade and how this affects the UK.
It describes efforts to produce global agree-
ments limiting illicit firearms trade, criti-
cises the failure of agreements thus far to
have an impact on illegal firearms supplies
and explains the reasons for their failure. 
The final chapter recommends a range
of policies that are being applied in other
countries and that would be useful in the
British context. We argue the need for a
well-articulated strategy of prevention,
intervention and suppression that targets
both the demand and the supply side of
gun and knife crime. 
Methodology
The primary research carried out for this
report comprises four city-level case stud-
ies: Amsterdam, Chicago, Toronto and
Boston. The case study cities were chosen
to reflect a variety of different experiences
of violent crime; and different approaches
to reducing violent crime. The research
team also wanted a diverse sampling of
cities with differing municipal government
structures, policing systems, and cultural
context. 
Boston and Chicago were chosen
because they have had success in reducing
violent crime but have used different
strategies. Toronto and Amsterdam are
more directly comparable to the British
experience, with tighter regulations on
firearms and lower rates of homicide. 
The case studies were built on both pri-
mary and secondary sources. Each consisted
of structured interviews with senior police
officers, local government officials, social and
outreach workers and police intelligence offi-
cers. The research methods employed also
include secondary data analysis, including
strategy, policy and tactical documents;
material provided by agencies including
police departments; police statistics; and lit-
erature review and analysis.
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Reducing Demand
The Public Health Approach
Policies built on the belief that the criminal
justice system alone holds the key to reduc-
ing violent crime are bound to falter.50 In
academic circles, research on curbing vio-
lent crime has moved on to encompass a
broader investigation of the environmental
factors that contribute to the root causes of
violent crime. How ever, the preventative
implications of the public health approach
have not yet been realised in practice. Both
the literature review of Going Ballistic and
the example of successful foreign pro-
grammes identified in this latest report
lead us to conclude that a public health
approach should be central to a strategy for
reducing violent crime in the long term. 
The public health approach is based on
the principle that violence is a disease, one
best tackled by prevention. Instead of
focusing on the actions of individual citi-
zens, it considers how to improve the phys-
ical and social environment to reduce the
likelihood of destructive behaviour and to
reduce the harm done by such conduct.51
As David Hemenway has argued, “a key
step in the public health approach is to
change social norms—not only norms of
behaviour but also norms of attitude about
what conditions are acceptable. A com-
monly cited example is that of spitting in
public. In the early twentieth century spit-
ting in public places changed from normal
behaviour to an unacceptable practice”.52
Public health: risk factors
Public health studies have consistently
reported that laws that require safer storage
of firearms are linked to fewer deaths and
injuries from firearms.53 In one study, legis-
lation requiring gun owners to keep
firearms locked away was associated with
reductions in accidental deaths of chil-
dren.54 Similarly, evaluations of American
laws at the state level that restrict handgun
purchases have been followed by reduc-
tions in violent offences.55 Preventive legis-
lation can be effective, but effective sup-
pression of violent crime is crucial if its full
benefits are to be realised. 
The public health approach emphasises
the importance of dealing with both the
supply of violence (changing the physical
environment) and demand side (identify-
ing and mitigating the risk factors that lead
to violent behaviour). One of the most sig-
nificant risk factors contributing to violent
crime is membership of a street gang.
Comparisons between gang members and
non-gang members were statistically signif-
icant and showed that roughly two-thirds
of current gang members had taken a
weapon to commit an offence; more than
half had possessed a gun; and three-quar-
ters said they had mixed with people who
possessed guns.56
Risk factors associated with gang mem-
bership are, by and large, the same as those
associated with violent offending, be it gang
related or not. They include poverty, alco-
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hol, violence in the media, witnessing or
experiencing violence in the home, socially
disorganised communities, poor academic
performance, sub-standard housing, lack of
opportunities for social activities, lack of
access to legitimate employment, and pres-
ence of gang members in the family, peer
group or neighbourhood.57
Individual risk factors, including psy-
chological and biological characteristics
identifiable in children at very young ages,
may increase their vulnerability to negative
social and environmental influences as
they grow up.58 A number of studies have
suggested that gender may be a factor in
youth violence and this is supported by
arrest statistics for violent offences.59,60 The
risk factors associated with violent crime
are generally well known, but are worth
stating in detail.
Poverty is a major risk factor for involve-
ment in violence.61 Poverty clearly creates
vulnerability to violence, as it does for
many public health problems.62 Poorer
children are also more likely to grow up
without consistent contact with fathers or
positive role models.
A dysfunctional family – characterised
by abuse and neglect is likely to result in
violent behaviour.63 When violence takes
place in the home, children learn it as an
acceptable behaviour. Thus children who
experience violence firsthand as victims of
child abuse are more likely to commit vio-
lent acts themselves: hurt children become
hurtful children.64
Being exposed to crime and drug deal-
ing in a neighbourhood, as a consequence
of socially disorganised communities, is
another important risk factor for commit-
ting violence later in life.65 Drugs being
prevalent in a community may also be an
indicator of decreased economic opportu-
nity. Moreover, exposure to poverty both at
the neighbourhood and family level is like-
ly to co-occur with neighbourhood disor-
ganisation, also elevating risk for vio-
lence.66 Disorganised communities are
more likely to expose youths to a multi-
tude of risk factors and research has shown
that the likelihood of delinquency, mental
health disorders, and substance abuse
increases with exposure to a greater num-
ber of risk factors.67
Poor academic performance among
individuals is often cited as a risk factor. A
child’s level of academic achievement and
experiences in school are strongly correlat-
ed to violence risk.68 According to research,
children who have little interest in school
and perform poorly on academic tasks
from a young age are at risk not only for
school failure and exclusion, but from
engaging in anti-social behaviour and vio-
lence.69 Farrington found that children
who performed poorly in school had high-
er rates of self-reported violence.70
Access to employment, too, is an impor-
tant risk factor in both violent crime and
gang membership. Klein has previously
argued that “uneducated, underemployed
young males turn to the illegal economies
enhanced by gang membership, including
selling drugs in some instances. Older males
who in earlier decades would have matured
into more steady jobs and family roles hang
on to the gang structure by default.”71
Identifying these risk factors is essential
to the design of intervention and preven-
tion policies and they must be delivered by
a coherent and co-ordinated multi-agency
approach. Information sharing and risk
management is vital to delivering long-
term reductions in violent gun and knife
crime. Each city visited by the research
team gave some amount of insight into
how to build a successful multi-agency
strategy for dealing with violent crime.
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Lessons from Abroad
The Case Studies
This chapter analyses which programmes
work, which look promising and which are
ineffective.72 The work of the programmes
is broken down into the following cate-
gories:
 Suppression and police tactics
 Education
 Social intervention
 Community mobilisation and multi-
agency approach
 Provision of opportunities
 Offender management
A summary of the lessons learnt from each
city is set out in Table 3.
Toronto
Toronto is Canada’s largest city and one of
the most diverse cities on earth: nearly half
(49%) of its 2.5 million population was
born outside the country. It has one of the
lowest homicide rates of all major cities in
North America. In 2004 there were 1.8
homicides per 100,000 people, and homi-
cides oscillate between 65 and 70 a year.
Gang violence primarily involves hand-
guns, but knife crime has been growing.
The drugs trade has increased significantly
in the past five years, accompanied by an
escalation in inter-gang conflict and gun
crime.73
The city’s proximity to the American
border means that its gun controls are vul-
nerable to handguns smuggled across the
border. According to intelligence officers
in the Toronto police, illegal handguns sell
for between £650 and £700; 30-40% of
guns they recover are stolen registered
firearms and 60-70% of these have been
smuggled in from the US.74
Gun violence became an extremely sen-
sitive and political issue following a 2005
Boxing Day shooting in the centre of
Toronto in which several innocent
bystanders were wounded or killed.
Chicago
Chicago has a population of 2.8 million
people – similar in size to Toronto. But its
experience of crime has been entirely dif-
ferent. Chicago has traditionally had one
of the highest rates of homicide among
major American cities. It has averaged 724
homicides a year over the past 15 years.
The current homicide rate stands at about
15.65 per 100,000, more than double the
rate of New York (7 per 100,000). After a
peak of 943 homicides in 1992, Chicago
police reorganised its force in accordance
with the Chicago Alternative Policing
Strategy (CAPS).
Following the implementation of
CAPS, crime dropped throughout the
1990s, and in 2004, Chicago recorded 448
homicides, the lowest figure since 1965.
Total homicides in the city have remained
steady, reporting 449, 452, and 435 in
2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively. The
overall crime rate has continued the down-
ward trend that has taken place since the
early 1990s.75
Boston
Boston is a much smaller city than the oth-
ers discussed here; there are 581,000 peo-
ple living within the city limits. But
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Table 3: Lessons from international case studies
Suppression/ Police Tactics
Community Mobilisation and
Multi-Agency Approach
Education and Police in
Schools
Social Intervention
Offender Management 
Opportunities Provision
Boston
1. Targeted deployment in
hot-spot areas
2. Developed intelligence
dissemination process
3. Dedicated Youth Violence
Strike Force
1. Recognition that violence
is a community problem,
not just a police problem
2. Buy-in and co-operation
from health care profes-
sionals
3. Partnership with commu-
nity outreach work-
ers/clergy
1. Dedicated police schools
unit, with a permanent
presence in 50 of
Boston’s 150 schools
2. Police have established a
presence in middle and
elementary schools (inter-
vening as early as possi-
ble)
3. Use of school-wide inter-
ventions with clergy and
police
1. Direct partnership with
highly trained social work-
ers, operating within
police stations
2. Commitment to working
with the most hard-to-
reach youths
1. Governance structures
over criminal justice
agency provide for better
partnership working
2. Employment placement
for offenders
3. Strict monitoring of parole
compliance
1. Recognition of the link
between opportunities
and violent/gang crime
2. Investment in job training
and placement pro-
grammes produces sub-
stantial savings 
Chicago
1. Move to proactive, prob-
lem-solving policing
2. Improve intelligence gath-
ering
3. Development of TRU spe-
cialist units for flexible
deployment in hotspots
1. Make community engage-
ment a police priority
2. Creation of beat meetings
3. District advisory councils
to advise police beat com-
manders
1. Successful use of street
outreach workers
2. Partnership and informa-
tion sharing between street
workers 
3. Targeting outreach work
where it is most needed
Toronto
1. Focus police in hot-spots
2. Improve police intelligence
capability
3. Develop specialised, flexi-
bly deployed anti-violence
unit
1. Recognition of ethnic
diversity in communities
2. Increase cultural and lin-
guistic sensitivity through
officer training
3. Actively recruit minority
officers
1. Police liaison officers in all
violence-prone high
schools
2. Police officers embedded
in schools help students to
run an anti-violence edu-
cation programme
1. Long-term focus on pre-
vention planning
2. Sustainable funding
3. Engage with at-risk chil-
dren earlier rather than
later
Amsterdam
1. Long-term strategy: an
eight-year plan
2. Change to work process-
es, strategy and priorities
1. Police-developed anti-vio-
lence curriculum delivered
in schools 
2. Improved information shar-
ing between police and
schools
despite its smaller size, it has suffered many
of the same crime problems that blight
large urban centres in North America. 
Although overall homicide rates in the
United States declined between the 1980s
and the 1990s, youth homicide rates, par-
ticularly those involving firearms,
increased dramatically.76 Boston experi-
enced an unprecedented rise in youth vio-
lence beginning in the mid to late 1980s
and continuing through the early 1990s.77
According to research, the epidemic, meas-
ured as a homicide problem, was most
prevalent among 18 to 24-year-olds in the
city’s poor, predominantly black neigh-
bourhoods.78
Boston has faced challenging demo-
graphic trends. Between 1995 and 2005
the city experienced an increase in its ado-
lescent population of 45% for 10 to 14-
year-olds and a 38% increase for 15 to 19-
year-olds.79 26% of the city’s children are
living in poverty, 53% of children city
wide live in single parent homes and 20%
of children have no parent in the labour
force.80
Amsterdam
Firearm regulations in the Netherlands are
stringent. Gun owners must be members
of a Royal Netherlands Shooting
Association certified gun club for a full cal-
endar year to receive a licence. They must
be over the age of 18 and a gun licence
must be approved by police and renewed
annually. All firearms are registered in a
national database. Legislation passed in
2006 made weapons permits easier to
revoke – crimes or even “moving in crimi-
nal circles” now constitute grounds for rev-
ocation. However, even with tight regula-
tions, the use of firearms for criminal
and/or terrorist activities still has “an enor-
mous impact on Dutch society”.81
The growth of gun and knife crime in
Amsterdam has been similar to trends in
England and Wales, though it occurred
earlier. By the end of the 1990s,
Amsterdam was facing a similar problem
to England and Wales today.82 A homicide
took place almost every weekend in
Amsterdam in 1999. 
Suppression and Police Tactics
Toronto Case
Following the 2005 Boxing Day shooting
the Toronto police agreed that their tradi-
tionally reactive approach had to be
replaced by a policy of prevention.83 The
result was the Toronto Anti-Violence
Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) launched
the same year. It is a task force aimed at
reducing overall levels of violent crime, not
only gang-related violence. It is built on a
foundation of intelligence-led policing,
requiring police to improve their intelli-
gence-gathering capability and make better
use of collected intelligence. To build
capacity rapidly, police intelligence squads
have been given more money and man-
power. 
In order to combat rising gun violence
in hot spot areas, the police developed
three rapid deploy teams, capable of dou-
bling the police numbers in a given ‘beat’.
Each team consists of 72 officers, equiva-
lent to the size of two beat patrols, and
members are selected for their community
engagement skills.84 They provide the
police with the resilience required when
the risk of conflict increases, especially in
situations of gang violence.
Local unit commanders have effective-
ly been empowered to develop their own
response to violent crime in their area.85
And this has been made possible by focus-
ing resources on hotspots identified by
careful analysis of when, where and in
what circumstances violent crime is con-
centrated. This “focused neighbourhood”
initiative is supported by the Toronto
police crime information analysis unit,
which analyses crime data in real time to
inform officer deployment.86 The unit has
identified the 20 most violence-prone
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areas in the city and ranks them on vol-
ume and density of violent crime. Using
this data, the unit can determine which
areas need sustained increased enforce-
ment.87
Chicago Case
Homicides peaked in Chicago in 1992,
sparking wholesale changes in how the
Chicago Police Department operated. In
partnership with Professor Wesley Skogan
of Northwestern University, the department
developed the Chicago Alternative Policing
Strategy (CAPS). It was launched in April
1993 and after testing in pilot sites was
rolled out across the city. Chicago’s police
moved from being a largely centralised, inci-
dent-driven crime suppression agency to a
more decentralised, customer-driven organ-
isation dedicated to solving problems, pre-
venting crime and improving the quality of
life in the city’s neighbourhoods. 
At the outset, the entire police depart-
ment was trained in a five-step problem-
solving process and beat officers were sup-
ported by a co-ordinated system for deliv-
ering city services. Deployment strategies
have now shifted to a form of hotspot
policing, targeting resources where they are
most needed.88
Organisational change that makes a real
difference in fighting crime and helping to
solve neighbourhood problems is rewarded
as are individuals, who can win a depart-
ment problem solving award as well as
honourable mention certificates.89 The 25
districts also conduct their own award cer-
emonies for citizens who assist the com-
munity at large and participate in the
CAPS programme. 
Crime control and prevention are inte-
gral, and integrating parts, of the strategy.90
The department’s five-step problem-solv-
ing process includes: 
1. Identify and prioritise 
2. Analyse
3. Design strategies 
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4. Implement strategies
5. Evaluate and acknowledge success 
Thus, step 3, designing strategies, may
involve educating the public on prevention
techniques, or assisting a location to make
itself a less desirable target for criminal
activity. The creation and implementation
of prevention strategies are an important
part of the problem-solving process.
The initiative in Chicago covered all
areas of the city with highly visible (and
expensively deployed) foot patrols.91 In
2003 Chicago Police created the target
response units (TRUs) designed to give
additional manpower to hotspot areas as
needed. As in Toronto, the TRUs give the
flexibility and resilience the police need to
suppress instances of increased risk of vio-
lence. The response units are not connect-
ed to any other unit and are capable of
changing deployment on a daily basis. At
present, there are three TRUs in operation,
each comprising 80 officers. Their opera-
tional costs have been calculated at
$14,109,784 for the year 2009.92
As in Toronto, patrol deployment is
informed by intensive, real-time intelligence
analysis. The hub of intelligence for the
Chicago police is the Fusion Centre, which
opened in late 2007 and operates 24 hours
a day.93 All intelligence on major events
throughout the city is immediately commu-
nicated to the centre, where it is analysed
and disseminated to officers on the street.
The Fusion Centre brings together munici-
pal, state, and federal agencies to act on
intelligence. It is also responsible for
informing the deployment of officers and
produces a weekly intelligence bulletin with
updates on drug selling hotspots, gun vio-
lence and gang operation locations, the
whereabouts of wanted offenders and a list
of the week’s serious incident reports.
Because the Fusion Centre is opera-
tional 24 hours a day any new intelligence
is disseminated to officers immediately.
The intelligence unit of the Chicago Police
supplement the real time information sup-
plied by the Fusion Centre, which pro-
duces a weekly intelligence bulletin with
updates on drug selling hotspots, gun vio-
lence and gang operation locations, where-
abouts of wanted offenders, and a list of
that week’s serious incident reports.
Boston Case
As in Toronto and Chicago, Boston has
developed a problem-solving approach to
policing, making good use of intelligence
gathering and focused on accountability
for district level commanders. The Boston
Police Department has also found a bal-
ance between hotspot policing in violence-
prone areas and police engagement with
the community through Safe Street Teams
– foot and bicycle patrols in vulnerable
communities.94 Officers on these patrols
make an effort to check in with residents
and business owners and discuss any con-
cerns they have. The patrols have increased
police visibility in high-risk areas and
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The CAPS initiative also encouraged police and communities to take joint responsibility for public
safety, and so breakdown the “us against them” barrier that so often divides police and residents in
vulnerable neighbourhoods. A successful strategy for community involvement is to target faith-based
leaders who can assist the police with information as well as providing a voice for the community. A
civilian, volunteer facilitator is also appointed to each of the 280 beats throughout the City and facil-
itates the monthly beat community meeting with the police. An additional resource is the CAPS
implementation office within the Chicago Police Department. These are civilian employees who
organise and work with community members on prevention and chronic crime and disorder. This
group is credited for establishing a large faith-based police support group within the communities. 
helped to build social capital and commu-
nity organisation.95
The BPD has focused attention on
those communities where crime is concen-
trated and on the small percentage of
offenders who are responsible for the
majority of violence. Safe Street Teams
have been deployed specifically where vio-
lent crime is most likely to occur. Targeted
deployments that engage with and empow-
er the community have worked well in the
Safe Street Team sites. Bowdoin and
Geneva area had no homicides in 2007,
compared to five in 2006, and there has
been a 15% reduction in all violent crime
for the area.96 Grove Hall had one homi-
cide in 2007 and a 3% decrease in all vio-
lent crime. Overall, violent crime in the
sites fell by 12% from October 2007 to
March 2008.97
Intelligence
In order to inform targeted deployments,
Boston Police Department has an extreme-
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ly well developed intelligence gathering
and dissemination system known as the
Boston Regional Intelligence Center
(BRIC). BRIC is a local law enforcement
fusion centre designed to address the prob-
lem of collecting and analysing informa-
tion across multiple local law enforcement
jurisdictions and disciplines.98 It has adapt-
ed the federal intelligence cycle for local
community policing.99 BRIC has also
opened up the process of intelligence oper-
ations to local stakeholders, which has
enabled greater flows of information and
developed a sense of trust between com-
munity leaders and police. Intelligence
cycles are also run on a 24-hour basis,
making it more responsive to real-time
crime. 
The three most important measures of
success for BRIC are participation, products
and prevention. Numerous stakeholders
from public safety personnel to public health
workers and transportation department rep-
resentatives, and even private companies par-
ticipate in daily BRIC meetings with special-
ists in the areas of homeland security, gang
violence, street crime, organised crime and
technology crime.100
With a number of intelligence source
streams, BRIC produces an array of intelli-
gence products, including a daily brief, crime
maps and statistical compilations of crime
data. Intelligence flows both ways, and repre-
sentatives of stakeholder groups have multi-
ple means to pass on information.101
Youth Violence Strike Force
Because young men aged 16 to 24 are
responsible for most violent crime, the
BPD created the Youth Violence Strike
Force (YVSF). It is made up of 40 BPD
officers and 10 additional full-time officers
from outside agencies, who form a day and
a night unit.
The day unit is primarily proactive,
patrolling the city’s hotspots, identifying,
monitoring and developing intelligence on
the worst gang offenders.102 This year, the
strike force has been responsible for 20%
of the BPD’s firearms seizures, but
accounts for only 2% of the department’s
officers.103 
The night unit consists of two sergeants,
one sergeant-detective, twenty officers,
three detectives, one transit detective, and
eight Massachusetts state troopers.104 The
night unit’s primary responsibilities are
monitoring hotspots and key gang mem-
bers, gathering and disseminating intelli-
gence and formulating strategies on how to
address the problems with youth and gang-
related violence. 
Amsterdam Case
After a peak in violent crime in 1999,
Amsterdam introduced an eight-year strat-
egy to reduce gun and knife crime in the
city – the National Firearms Platform –
which balances enforcement and preven-
tion.105 In contrast to the approaches of the
1970s to the 1990s, when the fight against
firearms was mainly reactive, the current
procedure is built on six pillars: policy, pre-
vention, increasing the likelihood of appre-
hension, professionalism, work processes,
and co-operation.
The Government, police and NGOs
first needed to agree clear and tougher
norms with regard to the possession and
use of firearms. This is reflected in appro-
priate legislation (sentences have been
increased to four to eight years for posses-
sion of an illegal firearm), school regula-
tions, pub and restaurant licences, general
police ordinances, stop-and-search proce-
dures, and knife bans.106
The prevention pillar supports the imple-
mentation of policies that require concrete,
preventive measures. Targeted prevention
was at the centre of the second pillar. Its poli-
cies include: increased stop-and-search pow-
ers, monitoring of shooting clubs, spot
checks on gun-licence holders, information
and inspection at schools and the screening
of people visiting pubs and clubs. Police and
mayors (Burgemeester) have the power to deal
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with violence prone bars and clubs by closing
establishments that do not adhere to codes of
safety. It is similar to the UK, where British
police keep a watchful eye on bars and clubs,
but local government has more power to act
than they do. 
To increase the chances of catching crim-
inals with illegal weapons, police in
Amsterdam increased their firearms investi-
gations, improved procedures for respond-
ing to intelligence, carried out more searches
of residences, and conducted more vehicle
checks. 
The professionalism and competence of
officers charged with reducing firearms
crime is being improved through education,
training, legal courses, exchanging of best
practice between forces and attending expert
meetings and workshops.107
In order to enhance professionalism and
ensure the delivery of the objectives of the
National Firearm Platform, it is important
that the work processes of all government
departments and agencies involved in the
fight against violent crime are able to
exchange information efficiently.108 This
means their work processes must evolve to
include the new data systems (such as the
Dutch national firearms data and drug file
systems). 
The sixth pillar of the National Firearms
Platform is co-operation, which – like align-
ing work processes – requires risk sharing
and management between departments.
Reducing gun and knife crime cannot be the
sole task of the police. Other Dutch govern-
ment agencies committed to the issue
include: the Royal Marechaussee, the
Economic Control Service, the Customs
Service, the Ministry of Justice and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, and other law enforce-
ment agencies. 
The long-term strategy and the role of
each pillar are represented in Figure 8. It
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Information
Use Possession Trafficking Source
Strategy
1. Policy
Determining norms and measures in relation 
to legislation, rules and regulations, and 
policy in support of the fight against firearms 
crime. including PR and the dissemination of 
information about this subject.
2. Prevention
Performing surveillance 
tasks in the public 
domain, carrying out 
measures in the 
public/private domain 
with the objective of 
disrupt possible 
criminal behaviour. 
3. Investigation
Efficiently and 
effectively applying 
existing and newly 
developed methods 
and tactics for tracing 
of suspects and 
seizing firearms
4. Professionalism 
The instruments, consisting of 
know-how, tools, and craftsman-
ship, needed for standardization, 
stopping crime, and increasing the 
chances of being caught.
5. Workprocesses
The elements of the general work 
process that support the fight 
against firearms crime, such as 
registration, information gathering 
and analysis, dissemination of 
information.
6. Cooperation
Entering into forms of cooperation 
with partners. 
Figure 8: Dutch approach to reducing firearm violence
shows how intelligence is the foundation of
a violent crime reduction strategy. 
The above figure shows how informa-
tion and intelligence on all facets of crimi-
nal firearms use inform strategy.
Intelligence should be the foundation of a
violent crime reduction strategy. Strategy is
then developed into policies dedicated to
prevention. 
Because the fight against violent gun and
knife crime requires an integrated approach
across government departments, a long-term
plan was devised, based on the six pillars, It
allowed the Dutch government and police to
avoid the pitfalls of a knee-jerk response to
the surge in gun crime. 
Community Mobilisation and a Multi-
agency Approach 
Boston – Multi-agency Approach
In the early 1990s, youth violence was
exacting a heavy toll on many communi-
ties in Boston. A number of agencies began
working to address the issue, but their
efforts were uncoordinated and piecemeal.
When he was appointed Chief of Boston
Police in 1991, William Bratton champi-
oned the formation of partnerships
between police and city agencies and they
formed the bedrock of violent crime pre-
vention in the city. The Boston Police
Department now boasts one of the most
well developed multi-agency strategies for
violent crime reduction in America.
Intervention work among high-risk youths
has benefited immensely from these part-
nerships, whose members can act on a
range of issues that fall outside the tradi-
tional remit of the police. For example, the
BPD has a close working relationship with
the Boston Center for Youth and Families
(BCYF), which is the largest social services
agency in the city. 
During the 1990s, BPD transformed
itself into a facilitator, able to act as a hub
for a number of organisations. The philos-
ophy of the BPD is that they are in a great
position to lead action – or bring together
agencies that can act – on a range of issues
that exist outside of the traditional remit of
the police. 
The head of the Boston Youth Violence
Strike Force commented: “[violence] is a
community problem that has to be solved
by a whole group of agencies, not just the
police; social service providers, street work-
ers, employment, public health, all these
different agencies combined, have a part to
play.”109 In July 2002 the BCYF was estab-
lished as the City’s youth and human serv-
ices headquarters, bringing together under
one roof the services provided by Boston
Community Centers; the Boston 2:00-
6:00 After School Initiative; the Mayor’s
Office of Community Partnerships; and
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Lessons − Suppression
Intelligence gathering and dissemina-
tion on key players involved in gangs
and violent crime was a vital element
in police tactics in all four cities stud-
ied. In England and Wales, the police
National Intelligence Model plays a
similar role. But more could be done
and there are useful lessons to learn
from police forces abroad.
Amsterdam’s work on combating vio-
lent gun and knife crime was based on
an eight-year plan, whereas the Home
Office’s action plan for tackling gangs
had an operational and funding lifes-
pan of less than two years. We believe
that long-term planning and funding is
essential if  long-term reductions in
violent crime are to be achieved. 
The rolling out of neighbourhood
policing has been a commendable
development in England and Wales,
but Toronto, Chicago, and Boston
have already advanced to hotspot
policing, a more efficient deployment
of resources that gives police added
flexibility and resilience in the most
high-risk areas. 
the Recreation Division of the City’s Parks
and Recreation Department. BCYF’s mis-
sion is “to enhance the quality of life for
Boston residents by supporting children,
youths, and families through a wide range
of comprehensive programs and servic-
es.”110 The organisation has 46 facilities
across 20 neighbourhoods and serves some
90,000 residents each year with childcare,
youth activities, adult education and
sports. BCYF also provides an alternative
education programme called City Routes
for youths who have been excluded from
school. 
Each site has four youth workers who
help to organise events, run workshops and
support the street worker programme – a
specialised unit of adults offering support
to young people involved in gangs.111 The
programme began in 1990 and currently
employs 26 street workers and four senior
street workers under the BCYF umbrella.
They are assigned to specific neighbour-
hoods and once they have built up a rela-
tionship with an individual they try to
steer him into gang exit support pro-
grammes. Many of the support services
offered will be through agency partners. 
Interventions and social work in
Boston tend to focus on the family unit,
rather than a single child or young per-
son. For any family intervention, one
agency will work with them on health
issues, another will work with them
through the schools, while law enforce-
ment will be looking to play any positive
role it can. There is a culture of co-opera-
tion among these agencies which encour-
ages them to communicate and share
information about what exactly is going
on with a particular family.112
Involving the healthcare community in
violence prevention was essential, though
not easy. It required the efforts of a small
number of healthcare professionals to
spread the message that as well as treating
the increasing number of victims of
youth violence, they had an opportunity
to intervene: these victims run a high risk
of suffering more injuries in the future.113 
Boston City H ospital implemented a
programme to ensure that all children and
youths admitted to the hospital with
injuries from violence receive a preven-
tion assessment and follow-up sessions to
reduce risks of future involvement.114
Patients treated with injuries from vio-
lence are seen by a multidisciplinary sup-
port team including both a trauma coun-
sellor and a violence prevention counsel-
lor. For victims of violence, there is a very
high risk that they will experience further
violent injuries in the future. Children
and youths were visited in the hospital by
an outreach worker, who continued to
work with patients after they were dis-
charged. 
Another multi-agency programme
involving healthcare is the Child Witness
to Violence Programme. As its name sug-
gests, it helps children who have been
exposed to violence of any sort. It is led by
a social worker, but referrals come from
hospitals and police. Children who have
witnessed violence exhibit symptoms simi-
lar to those seen in adult post-traumatic
stress disorder and need assessment and
counselling. With prompt support chil-
dren can learn to deal with their immedi-
ate symptoms and avoid longer-term con-
sequences – especially becoming violent
assailants themselves.
Most hospital emergency rooms in
Boston routinely screen for domestic vio-
lence and, increasingly, other units in hos-
pitals are doing the same.115 At the
Children’s Hospital Medical Center in
Boston, a programme called AWAKE rou-
tinely screens for domestic violence in fam-
ilies where child abuse has been found and
provides extensive social, legal and mental
health services to address multiple issues
simultaneously.
Boston Police Department has also
joined forces with academics from the
Kennedy School of Government at
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Harvard University. Together they have
created the Boston Gun Project, an inter-
agency working group. It has applied
quantitative and qualitative research tech-
niques to assess the nature and dynamics of
youth violence in Boston; designed a
short-term intervention strategy; and
developed and evaluated Operation
Ceasefire, a programme to combat youth
gun crime. The programme, based on the
“pulling levers” deterrence strategy,116 deliv-
ered an unequivocal message to gangs that
violence would no longer be tolerated.117
The message was then backed by pulling
every lever legally available to law enforce-
ment officials when violence occurred.118
The working group would only target spe-
cific gangs as a result of violent behaviour.
Once they had been warned against future
violent crime, those gangs specifically tar-
geted by police were effectively self-select-
ing.119 Although the pulling levers
approach was instrumental in BPD’s
enforcement strategy, it was carried out in
concert with other agencies (probation,
housing, social services, etc). 
Boston – Community Mobilisation
The reduction in youth homicide and
violence in Boston can be attributed to a
broad process that led to changes in atti-
tudes and beliefs beginning with commu-
nity engagement and grassroots crime
prevention. Two doctors, Deborah
Prothrow-Stith and Howard Spivak, have
been central to this success. They began
work on violence prevention as early as
1982 with a four-year grant from the
Boston health department. Their project
adopted a broader public health
approach, identifying risk factors that
drive children and youths towards vio-
lence, many of which were found to be
rooted in the community environment.120
(In the 1980s violence was only just
beginning to be recognised as a public
health problem; today the role of environ-
mental factors in violent crime is well
supported by research.)121,122
Prothrow-Stith and Spivak went on to
establish the first public health-based ini-
tiative for the prevention of youth violence
in America – the Boston Youth Violence
Prevention Project – funded by local phi-
lanthropists and their own Boston
Foundation. 
For an entire year, the focus of the proj-
ect was to “pound the pavement” and build
a community of support.123 Efforts at
building community co-operation were
supplemented with approaches to all possi-
ble stakeholders. The police, city hall, juve-
nile courts, mental health staff, youth
workers, social workers, clergy, housing
associations and school administrators
were contacted in an appeal to take action
on preventing violence. Members of the
Boston Youth Violence Prevention Project
attended community meetings of all sorts
to spread the word. The goal in the early
stages was to drive a shift in social norms
and attitudes towards violence and com-
munity safety. After this, it moved on to
outreach work and the training of youth
work professionals in violence prevention.
Outreach work was targeted at specific
neighbourhoods and two dedicated out-
reach workers, familiar with the more chal-
lenging neighbourhoods of Boston, were
recruited and trained. 
As more and more community groups
began to work with the project and the
out-reach workers developed relationships
with at-risk youths, the need to sustain the
project became a priority. Funding is
always an issue for violence prevention
programmes, for both those operating in
the third sector and those run by the gov-
ernment. It secured philanthropic funding
for several years, and finally its proven
effectiveness in violence prevention per-
suaded the City of Boston to fund the pro-
gramme. 
Another grassroots initiative that has
formed a partnership with the Boston
Police Department is the Ten Point
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Coalition of clergy and lay leaders, formed
in 1992 after a gang shooting erupted in
Morning Star Baptist Church during the
funeral of a young gun-shot victim.124
The Ten Point Coalition focuses on at-
risk youths in communities that the city’s
services are unable to reach, or even identi-
fy. It collaborates with other groups, agen-
cies, and institutions to reduce duplication
of effort. The mayor’s office has asked the
coalition to focus on eight hotspots and it
also works with the BPD to mediate
between gangs. Its intervention may be
triggered by a single event or a call for
assistance from the police schools unit.
Mentoring is also extended to offenders
from the moment they are taken into cus-
tody. Mentors are often ex-offenders them-
selves, and are thus able to identify with
their clients. They work with a case man-
ager, handling caseloads of around 50
offenders at a time.125 The cost to the city
of funding the mentors and case workers is
$176,979 per year.
The Safe Neighbourhood Initiative
(SNI) has also aided police engagement
with communities through its three core
principles: co-ordinated law enforcement;
neighbourhood revitalisation; prevention,
intervention, and treatment.126 The SNI
allows community residents to work
directly with police and government offi-
cers to identify and address neighbour-
hood issues.127 Regular communications
through meetings and better co-ordination
of government resources have helped to
ensure its success.
The SNI employs project co-ordinators
who are responsible for steady leadership
and day-to-day operation. It provides a for-
mal mechanism for exchange between
community residents and police, and hav-
ing two dedicated co-ordinators ensures
that the dialogue between police and the
community remains open. The cost of two
co-ordinators for targeted communities is
$110,433, and they are funded by a state
level grant.128
Chicago – Community Mobilisation
From its inception, the Chicago
Alternative Policing Strategy has made
community involvement – building rela-
tionships with residents, business owners,
and community leaders – a priority.
There was early recognition that the suc-
cess of CAPS rested squarely on grass-
roots engagement and that the strength
of Chicago’s neighbourhoods would
determine whether or not the programme
was successful. In an effort to create a
strong sense of awareness about public
safety, CAPS instituted monthly beat
meetings in each of the city’s 281 police
beats.
In 1996, two years after it began, a sur-
vey found that a majority of Chicago res-
idents (59%) knew about the change in
police strategy and the implementation
of community policing.129 By 1998, 79%
of Chicago residents were aware of CAPS
and in 2003 the figure was 81%.
Although the level of awareness sur-
rounding CAPS was encouraging, it did
not guarantee participation. Community
engagement in CAPS was formally based
on the beat meetings, unique to
Chicago’s community policing pro-
gramme. The meetings have several pur-
poses: they provide a forum at which
police and residents can exchange infor-
mation and prioritise local concerns.130
Evaluation of CAPS has found that atten-
dance at beat meetings is often highest in
areas where public safety challenges are
most difficult.131
Participation in beat meetings has
risen slightly since they were rolled out
across the city in 1995. In their first year,
58,000 Chicagoans attended beat meet-
ings. In 2002 (the last year for which
complete data is available) the total num-
ber of attendees was 67,300.132 There are,
however, still improvements to be made
to the system and issues that need to be
resolved to make beat meetings more
effective. Officer turnover in beats and
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districts still remains too high, making it
harder to establish relationships of trust
with residents. Expectations also have to
be managed. Some residents who attend
beat meetings expect too much from the
police, which can lead to disappointment
and unproductive meetings.
Another vehicle for public involve-
ment in CAPS are the district advisory
committees, widely known as DACs.
These are groups of residents, communi-
ty organisation leaders, business owners
and representatives of local institutions,
who meet regularly with the commander
and police district leaders to discuss dis-
trict affairs. DACs were established to
assist district commanders in establishing
community safety priorities and the most
appropriate police tactics to meet those
priorities. In return, district commanders
can expedite the resolution of communi-
ty problems by helping local residents to
access resources from city services.
Evaluation surveys showed that public
confidence in the Chicago Police
Department improved steadily from
1994, when CAPS began, to 1999. After
reaching a high in the early 2000s public
confidence levelled off.133
Systematic community engagement
through community policing, monthly
beat meetings and the district advisory
committees have changed attitudes to
public safety in Chicago’s neighbour-
hoods. Policing with a strong focus on
prevention is popular, and communities
are aware that together with the police
they can improve local public safety. In
this respect, policing in England and
Wales has a long way to go.
Toronto – Community Mobilisation
Toronto’s efforts to reduce violent gun
and knife crime only began in earnest
three years ago; changing police strategy
has been the cornerstone. As well as
improving its intelligence-led strategy
and deploying resources more efficiently,
efforts have been made to improve com-
munity engagement in the city’s 13 most
diverse neighbourhoods.134
In 2005, a special unit of minority
officers began work in these socially
excluded communities; meanwhile
Toronto police are actively trying to
recruit more minority officers with
much-needed language abilities. The
Toronto Police Services Board has spon-
sored a youth cricket programme to
establish better links with minority com-
munities and find potential recruits.
Another successful programme employs
interns from minority backgrounds with
the aim of recruiting more minority
police cadets. Meanwhile, the number of
minority officers being promoted to sen-
ior positions has increased.
Police training has been reformed, so
that officers deployed to hotspots have
improved problem-solving capabilities
and can engage with communities bet-
ter.135
Since the new training programmes
began operating, complaints against the
police dropped 20% from 2005 to 2007.136
Police recorded contacts (documentation
that a police officer has spoken to someone
on the street) increased 60% over the same
period.137 The push for a more diverse and
representative police force has created a
cultural shift within the police force, which
has been welcomed as overwhelmingly
positive.138 Public support has increased
since 2005.139
Where police have increased deploy-
ment in hotspots, they have taken every
precaution to let residents know that they
are targeting dangerous behaviour and
not the people of the neighbourhood in
general. Police in these areas give out
business cards in multiple languages
explaining why deployment has been
increased. There is a practical focus on
disseminating information and intelli-
gence to street-level officers, who then
pass it on to members of the public.
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Education and Police in Schools
Identifying and addressing the early risk
factors associated with youth violence at
appropriate points in childhood develop-
ment is important for prevention.140
Teachers and school administrators are
normally best placed to identify the first
signs that a child or youth is exhibiting
violent behaviour or a potential for vio-
lence. Schools in high-risk communities
should have a well developed, coherent
anti-violence curriculum, as well as an
embedded relationship with the police
service.
Toronto Case
In England and Wales, both offenders and
victims of violent crime have become
younger over the past ten years.141 This
phenomenon has also been witnessed in
Toronto.142 Because a significant amount of
youth violence takes place in and around
schools, the Toronto Police Service places
police officers in high schools in high-risk
areas. Police liaison officers are permanent-
ly based in schools and work to build rela-
tionships and trust with students. 
The police presence in schools has led to
better engagement with students in vio-
lence-prone schools: students take an
active role in prevention, developing an
education curriculum on conflict manage-
ment and the risk of violence. Schools in
Toronto that have a police liaison officer
have more reporting of threats and bully-
ing and a drop in victimisation rates.143
While the focus of the programme was ini-
tially on high schools, it will soon be
expanded to include middle schools in
high-risk areas. 
Dr Alok Mukherjee, chairman of the
Toronto Police Services Board, has empha-
sised the need to manage conflict and risk,
and cites the police liaison programme as
essential in tackling youth violence. It pro-
motes information sharing between teach-
ers, school administrators and police, a
huge step forward in risk management.
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Lessons − Community
Mobilisation
The creation of Crime and Disorder
Reduction Partnerships (CDRPS) in
1998 established an excellent mech-
anism for co-ordination between
police and a range of local govern-
ment agencies in England and Wales.
Although CDRPs have aided partner-
ship working, performance varies
widely across the country. Without
any one office holding CDRPs to
account, there is no mechanism for
ensuring adequate co-operation
between police and local government
agencies.
In contrast to the British experi-
ence, Boston and Chicago have
been able to co-ordinate multi-
agency efforts to reduce violent
crime. Because the police and all city
agencies are ultimately accountable
to the mayor, partnership work is
more of an institutional priority. 
The Boston experience in particu-
lar highlights the value of partner-
ships formed with academics. The
relationship the BPD forged with
researchers at the Kennedy School
of Government at Harvard University
has proved invaluable. Although the
Home Office commissions academ-
ics to contribute to central research
programmes, the partnership
between the BPD and Harvard is fun-
damentally different, focusing on
issues specific to the Boston con-
text. 
Finally, the progress that the
Toronto police service has made in
developing sensitivity to ethnic
minorities and its recruiting tactics
and community engagement in
minority areas are worthy of further
study. 
Schools and police have always had an
uneasy relationship in cities on both sides
of the Atlantic. School administrators are
often reluctant to bring police officers into
schools, as it implies that the school has a
violence problem. While police liaison
officers were initially introduced to high-
risk schools only, Dr Mukherjee has com-
mitted the board to bringing them into
every highschool in Toronto.144
Boston case
Getting co-operation from schools has not
been an easy task. Boston police have had
a dedicated unit assigned to schools for
more than ten years.145 The unit has a per-
manent presence in 50 of the 150 schools
in Boston, and 80 officers serve in the unit.
At the outset, it worked only with high
schools, but it quickly became clear that
effective prevention was needed at the
middle school level.146 More recently,
police have concluded that to reach at-risk
children and really educate them about the
dangers of gang violence, they need a pres-
ence in elementary schools.147 This strategy
is backed up by research findings on pre-
vention.148 If primary school aged children
start forming gangs, they may not under-
stand what they are ultimately getting
themselves into.149 There may, however, be
substantive reasons why they want to
group together – protection from another
group, for example. Where there is a police
presence in schools, such issues can be eas-
ily resolved and most children involved in
mimicking gang behaviour have no prob-
lem slipping back into the mainstream.150
Initially, the police went into schools to
gather intelligence on gangs, and met sig-
nificant resistance. One interviewee said:
“We’ve had some schools that didn’t want
us on the same street because, whatever we
were doing, will impact their school in a
negative light.”151
The police are fully aware of the dan-
gers of over-criminalising young people.
When a youth in Boston is arrested, he
will get what is called a Criminal Offender
Record Information (CORI), which will
show up on background checks.152 A per-
son with a CORI cannot go into the mili-
tary or work at a bank. Getting a job any-
where becomes very difficult depending
on the seriousness of the arrest: doors of
opportunity shut. As a result, the schools
unit does everything it can to avoid crim-
inal prosecution.153
In one example, a group of elementary
students got their friends together and start-
ed wearing red bandanas (signalling gang
colours). Teachers thought that they were
merely mimicking the gangster lifestyle, but
were nevertheless concerned that it would
lead to dangerous behaviour. When the
school police intervened, they found that
the students involved were the children of
former gang members – a massive risk fac-
tor for future violent behaviour. The school
unit police spoke to their parents and
explained that their children were in danger
of following the same destructive path that
they had. Afterwards the children did much
better in school. As one school unit detec-
tive told us, “I think that we really have to
educate children at the primary school
[level]; stay on top of students in middle
(secondary) schools; and then you’re going
to see a drastic decline [in violent incidents]
in high schools.”154
One of the most effective school inter-
vention programmes run by Boston Police
is Operation Homefront, which was origi-
nally developed as a grassroots partnership
between BPD and local clergy. It is designed
to reach the students most at risk of gang
involvement and aims to offer them positive
alternatives to gang activity; it provides
referrals to various services and informs par-
ents of their children’s involvement in anti-
social behaviour and gangs.155
Supplementing targeted, individual
interventions, Operation Homefront runs
anti-gang presentations at schools to large
audiences of students. Presentations are
also given to parents of high-risk or gang-
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involved youth. They highlight the conse-
quences of violence and outline the array
of resources available to students and
teachers to reduce violence. Following a
general presentation, a list of the most at-
risk students is created by the team of part-
ners involved in Operation H omefront.
Based on the list, clergy, police, school
administrators, and probation officers con-
duct home visits. Interventions are not
reactive and do not need to be triggered by
a school-wide problem or major incident.
Each year Operation Homefront makes
an estimated 800 home visits to young
people identified by police as at risk .156
The School Police Unit has consistently
reported that approximately 80% of home
visits are successful within each quarterly
reporting period.157 Home interventions
were deemed successful if there was no fur-
ther interaction with police or a violent
incident. 
Operation Stop Watch is a school-based
initiative addressing truancy in and around
Boston public schools and Massachusetts
Bay Transport Authority stations. It
involves transit police, Boston Police
Schools Unit, the Youth Violence Strike
Force, juvenile probation services and a
myriad of volunteers and provides high vis-
ibility and proactive law enforcement
strategies in high crime areas, with a focus
on schools and students.158
Amsterdam case
Research on the Dutch experience of youth
violence suggested that youths were likely
to carry weapons for self-protection. As a
result police became involved in delivering
a school curriculum on the dangers of car-
rying and using weapons.159
Mayors in the Netherlands can give
police in particular areas short-term, ran-
dom stop-and-search powers and have
done so in areas surrounding high-risk
schools. According to interviewees, these
powers have been used effectively in
Amsterdam.160
Information sharing between schools
and police has improved significantly
under the Firearms Platform.161 Schools
have committed to registering incidents of
violence and weapons carrying, although it
is done carefully, and at times reluctantly,
as schools do not want to be stigmatised.
Police also gather information in an infor-
mal way, which does not always require the
criminalisation of incidents at schools. In
Amsterdam, there are between 40 and 50
schools that are now co-operating with the
police on weapons control. 
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Lessons − Education
Ideally, social services should be able
to identify the most at-risk children
before they have reached primary
school. Programmes like Sure Start –
despite implementation problems –
show promise. Additionally, home
visits for young, first-time, and at-risk
mothers have been reported to be
effective in mitigating risk factors for
violent behaviour in their children.162
Police in London have done well to
engage some secondary schools in
London neighbourhoods, but have not
gone beyond that. Boston has moved
from embedding police in high
schools, to engaging with middle
schools, and recently with primary
schools, allowing them to intervene at
the earliest point in education.
Boston’s use of schools as a venue for
anti-violence intervention and conflict
resolution is also worth noting. 
Police in England and Wales
should look at the experiences of
cities abroad that have successfully
engaged with schools and look to
improve partnerships with schools.
School administrators need to move
beyond the fear of stigmatisation that
comes with putting police in schools.
Social Intervention
Street outreach work requires individuals to
“pound the streets”, making contact and
establishing relationships with youths in vul-
nerable neighbourhoods.163 They serve three
important roles in the fight against violent
crime. First, they communicate to youth in
high-risk areas that violence will not be toler-
ated by police and, if they engage in violence,
they can expect to face the strongest possible
punishment. Secondly, street workers build
relationships with at-risk youths and can refer
them to neighbourhood  programmes for
educational or vocational support, or anti-
substance abuse services. Thirdly, they engage
with youth in activities and learn about
potential conflicts, with the aim of disrupting
future violence. 
Street outreach workers, co-operating
closely with police and social workers, have
been a crucial part of the community safety
initiative structure that has helped Boston
to combat violent crime and youth crime.164
Outreach work usually takes one of
three forms. The programme-based model
aims to establish contact with at-risk
youths and get them to join programmes
where they will receive further counselling,
opportunity for education and job train-
ing, and/or referrals to other services.165
This model is usually run by agency-based
street workers (such as the Boys’ and Girls’
Club of Boston), working in collaboration
with a team of other agency employees
who are responsible for providing case
management, direct services and referrals
of young persons identified by the street
workers. 
The clinical model provides one-on-one
intensive intervention services between a
clinical social worker and a young person at
risk of gangs and violence. The Youth
Service Providers Network in Boston
(which is discussed later) is an example of
this model. Police and other agencies refer
individuals at risk to the clinical social
worker, who can provide crisis intervention,
trauma services, youth risk assessment or
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Table 4: Models for Outreach Work
Model
Clinical
Programme-based
Street-based 
Strengths
Provides professional individual level assessment and coun-
selling services to youth.
Monitors the progress of a small number of high-risk youth
on a more consistent basis because of the ongoing contact
between individual youth and social worker.
Contacts a large number of young people and can serve as
a program referral source for them.
Relatively easy to deploy to neighbourhoods which are
experiencing gang violence.
Understand community dynamics and have credibility with
large numbers of neighbourhood youth.
Extremely flexible and among the least expensive.
Weaknesses
Costs exceed alternative models due to employed licensed
social workers.
May be a little less flexible to respond to street level events
in real time due to professional values and modes of work.
Relies on their agreement to attend the programmes rec-
ommended. Outreach workers generally have little ability to
monitor the progress of youths.
Concerns about mixing gang and non-gang members in
the same activities, increasing gang cohesion and ensuring
that gang workers do not over-identify with gang members.
Agency policies or regulations sometimes limit the ability of
street outreach workers to serve the most at-risk youth.
Lack of training and supervision can occasionally put the
street worker or some youths they are involved with at risk
of violence or retaliation from others who are involved with
gangs.
other interventions intended to decrease
risky behaviour.166
The third model of outreach work is
the street-based intervention model. Its
goal is to mediate conflicts between youth
on the street to reduce violence and bring
peace to gangs in conflict. It may also
refer individuals to youth service pro-
grammes or a centralised agency. Street-
based intervention programmes are often
administered by a youth service agency
but the day-to-day activities of the street
workers are often not connected to the
agency’s work.167 Street workers are
recruited from a variety of sources. Some
may be reformed former gang members.
However, caution should be exercised in
hiring street workers. There have been
instances of street workers aggravating
problems, not alleviating them.168
Boston Case
Boston’s Youth Service Providers Network
(YSPN) is an outreach programme based
on the clinical model of outreach work.
YSPN acts as a safety net for the most vul-
nerable and high-risk youths who come
into contact with police. It employs only
the most highly qualified youth social
workers. All are required to have a master’s
degree, are licensed as  psychotherapists,
carry out clinical assessments and are gen-
erally better paid then average city or state
social worker.169
YSPN staff work out of police stations in
Boston, but are not employed by police.
There is a network social worker in every
police station in Boston, but they remain
clearly separate from the police and are very
careful about sharing any information with
officers. They work with the most troubled
youths over a long period of time and are able
to produce very good results through devel-
opment of positive relationships. Besides pro-
viding intensive counselling, YSPN staff are
responsible for getting youths into alternative
education, substance abuse programmes,
health services and/or vocational training.
The network focuses on the most diffi-
cult and hard-to-reach 20% of youths who
are caught up in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Upon referral of a case, the social
worker meets with the youth in question to
understand what has led to his or her refer-
ral and devises a plan of action that may
include long-term counselling using
resource-intensive multisystems therapy
(MST).170
The YSPN started in the mid 1990s
with a funding grant from the
Comprehensive Communities Grant. The
goal of the organisation then was to assist
police in their engagement with neigh-
bourhoods. As the head of YSPN
explained, “Eventually, someone thought,
‘wouldn’t it be great if a police officer had
a phone number and they could call a
social worker, and he or she could get to
the root of some of the problems these kids
face?’”171
Eventually YSPN social workers took up
residence in police stations, so that they
could take referrals directly from police
officers. Now they have access to all inci-
dent reports from police when they arrest a
young person and are able to identify
trends in offending. “We can look at every
incident report and you begin to think ‘this
family is always in trouble, or they’re
always the victim’”.172 This was extremely
helpful “because we know that it’s 2 to 3%
of the population that is responsible for
90% of crime”.173
Working primarily out of police sta-
tions, each district based social worker pro-
vides service to approximately ten new
young people a month. In the course of a
year, a district based social worker will pro-
vide services to 120 new clients and con-
tinue seeing 40 clients from the previous
year.
Chicago Case
The Chicago Project for Violence
Prevention started in 2000 and works with
community-based organisations to develop
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and implement strategies to reduce and
prevent violence, particularly shootings
and killings.174 Its CeaseFire project, which
began operating in 2004, has been a model
of outreach to at-risk youths.
CeaseFire’s activities are divided into
five core components that address both the
community and those individuals who are
most at risk of involvement in gun and
knife crime: community mobilisation, out-
reach, faith leader involvement, public
education and police participation.175
Conflict mediation is its most important
activity. CeaseFire’s outreach workers and
conflict mediators are “streetwise individu-
als who are familiar with gang life in the
communities where CeaseFire is active”.176
Many street workers in the programme are
former gang members and have spent time
in prison, but they have reformed and are
now eager to keep others from making the
same mistakes. CeaseFire street workers
use their experience and knowledge of the
streets to seek out and build relationships
with vulnerable youths who are susceptible
to the violent norms that exist in high-risk
neighbourhoods.
Conflict mediators (or violence inter-
rupters) are a component of CeaseFire. Like
outreach workers, most mediators have
served time in prison and were, at one point
in their life, close to Chicago’s gangs. Rather
than working with individual clients, they
mediate between gangs and diffuse inter-
gang tension before violence erupts.177
Canadian Cases
The National Crime Prevention Centre
(NCPC) in Ottawa provides national lead-
ership on effective ways to prevent and
reduce crime by intervening on the risk
factors before crime happens. The NCPC
approach is to promote the implementa-
tion of effective crime prevention practices
through funding and evaluating innovative
prevention programmes and spreading best
practice through evidenced-based research.
The following gives an overview of NCPC
sponsored programmes that have shown
promise in reducing violent crime. 
Project Early Intervention
Project Early Intervention (PEI) was a pro-
gramme that provided support to high-risk
children aged 6 to 12 years, living in high-
needs social housing neighbourhoods in
Ottawa between 1999 and 2003. The ini-
tiative offered life skills development class-
es, a homework support centre, sports and
recreation opportunities and ongoing
counselling. 
Priority was given to children who had a
sibling or parent involved in the criminal
justice system; were living in homes affect-
ed by domestic violence; and/or were
engaged in behaviour likely to result in
charges under the Young Offenders Act.
One of the programme’s key strengths was
its focus on a specific set of at-risk chil-
dren. 
The project received three-year funding
totalling CA$600,000 to cover costs asso-
ciated with developing and evaluating a life
skills programme for children. The expect-
ed outcomes of the project were increased
school attendance, reduced crime, violence
and antisocial behaviour and calls to police
for service. 
PEI worked well in partnership with
Ottawa Housing, the housing association,
which made space available for classroom
and meeting spaces. The local elementary
school donated its library and gymnasium
for use in recreational and sports program-
ming. 
The social skills pilot programme
included role-play activities, videos, discus-
sions and games aimed at teaching children
about impulse control, anger management
and conflict avoidance and resolution.178
Programme co-ordinators also hired two
neighbourhood teens to act as de facto
mentors and to help identify children most
at risk. 
Evaluation of the project showed that
the sports and recreation component gave
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participants the chance to apply the life
skills learned in the classroom. Aggressive
behaviour and violence, social exclusion,
and general mental health and develop-
ment showed improvement. PEI is a prom-
ising crime prevention initiative for chil-
dren. The project contributed to building
knowledge of recreational and life-skills
programmes that help them to become
positive members of the community. 
Kids 1st Project
The Kids 1st Project was a crime prevention
programme for children aged 9 to 11 years
that ran from 2000 to 2004. The programme
was offered to children who were at risk of, or
had already been involved in, criminal and/or
violent behaviour. The objective of the proj-
ect was to help at-risk children avoid future
violent and delinquent behaviour by promot-
ing the acquisition and maintenance of social
skills.
The programme was delivered over the
course of a year by childcare professionals
and educators on a voluntary basis. The
Kids 1st Project offered participants a vari-
ety of services, including individual coun-
selling, family support and partnership
with schools. Evening sessions at an
Attendance Centre Phase for 12 weeks
helped children to develop new skills and
to reduce problem behaviours. The pro-
gramme provided structured activities,
which centred on developing thinking
skills, behaviour management and social
recreation. 
Access to appropriate support services
was facilitated by the project’s community
placement phase. This was available to par-
ticipants for an additional 36 weeks and
included 12 booster sessions in which chil-
dren and their families received structured
maintenance within a group setting. 
Evaluation of the project examined atti-
tudes and behaviours of 60 participants
before and after the intervention. This was
complemented by a comprehensive risk
assessment drawn up from parents, teachers
and project staff before and after the pro-
gramme. Contacts with police among partic-
ipants were also recorded in the evaluation. 
The evaluation reported that at-risk chil-
dren in need of prevention services were suc-
cessfully targeted by the Kids 1st Project.
91% of the children involved in the project
were classified as high-risk, meaning they
were affected by multiple risk factors.179 The
drop-out rate among participants was low
and overall attendance was high. However,
the project was not without shortcomings.
There were difficulties linking participants to
available support services in their communi-
ty, something which intervention pro-
grammes in England and Wales also suffer
from.180
The outcome evaluation indicated that
social skills improved, at least in the short
term. Problems in the areas of mental
health, social and cognitive skills, conse-
quential thinking, social perspective taking,
problem solving and interpersonal skills
were reduced. There were also statistically
significant changes regarding aggressive
behaviour and incidents of violence.181
Nearly two years after the completion of the
programme, only 13.3% of participants had
had any contact with the police, a positive
outcome given that all participants were
high risk. However, because the project ran
for only four years, the long-term impact of
the intervention was not as effective as it
could have been. 
Middle School Project: Families & Schools
The Middle School Project was an imple-
mentation of the Family and Schools
Together programme for children aged 9 to
12 years, who exhibited risk factors such as
isolation, school difficulties and aggressive
behaviour, and came from disorganised
families. It was offered in six schools in four
provinces over a three-year period starting
during the 2002-03 school year and 206
families completed the programme.182
The goal was to develop resilience skills
in children to reduce the likelihood of their
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being involved in future violence and crim-
inal behaviour. A team including school
staff, community agency representatives,
parents and children was formed at each
school to plan and deliver weekly sessions
for families and their children over 11
weeks. Activities included a family meal,
family communication games, time for chil-
dren to interact with one another, a parent
support group, and one-to-one time
between parent and child. 
For the evaluation process, a quasi-exper-
imental design was used. Data was collected
from participants for an 11 week non-inter-
vention period before the start of the pro-
gramme and again at intake, thus enabling
evaluators to compare any changes occur-
ring over the 11 weeks of the programme
with those occurring during the earlier peri-
od.183 Post programme data was collected at
two-year intervals to determine whether
goals were met and sustained. 
The evaluation process reported that
over 30% of the participants functioned
below their academic grade level at intake;
90% had received in the past, or were cur-
rently receiving, some type of special serv-
ice from their school; 45% of families who
entered the programme reported income
levels below CA$30,000 (£16,215) per
year. Upon entry, the children had below
average social skills, as rated by parents and
teachers on the social skills rating scale
(SSRS).184 Most families attended all nine
family sessions and the mean attendance
for graduating families was 8.4. 
Self-reported satisfaction with the pro-
gramme was high, with parents giving a
mean rating of 8.7/10. Family adaptability
and cohesion increased slightly over time,
but there was no statistically significant shift
in the level of social isolation. Children’s
social skills ratings improved post-pro-
gramme, but their scores returned to intake
levels after one year. Teachers’ ratings of aca-
demic competency occurred between intake
and year one follow-up. Some children also
showed significant reductions in school
office referrals.185 
The Middle School Project targeted very
high-risk families whose difficulties were so
entrenched that short-term prevention was
not likely to have the desired results; a pro-
gramme of greater intensity and duration
would be more appropriate. How ever, the
project was a success in making inroads to the
children targeted, and initially engaging the
families. Where the programme failed was in
its ability to link these children and families
into further services. This is a challenge for all
intervention programmes. Even with decent
partnership arrangements, there needs to be
better co-ordination between support service
providers and those working directly with at-
risk children and families.
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Lessons − Outreach
All of the above programmes have
lessons for the development of vio-
lence prevention initiatives in the
United Kingdom. The most important
is the need for long-term pro-
grammes when targeting those most
at risk: a one-year programme with
little follow up will not be able to
generate the impact desired, as the
Middle School Project showed. They
also illustrate the need to engage
with at-risk children earlier rather
than later. 
Boston’s YSPN programme also
illustrates the importance of identify-
ing and supporting the most at-risk
of young offenders. Although there
are a number of support pro-
grammes available to at-risk young
people, none provides mentors to
channel them into the resources
available. The Home Office should
consider embedding highly trained
social workers into a limited number
of urban police stations. 
Provision of Opportunities
Professor John Pitts, author of the ground-
breaking report Reluctant Gangsters, has
argued that lack of access to labour markets is
a crucial factor in gang membership.186 Pitts
makes the case that without sufficient
employment opportunities, at-risk youths are
more likely to join a street gang, often one
engaged in the black market economy. While
that may seem self-evident, not enough
urban centres have made job training and
employment for at-risk youth a top priority.
The most obvious barrier is adequate fund-
ing. Employment training and placement
programmes have a great deal of potential for
reducing violent crime and producing sav-
ings (reduced police, court and incarceration
costs), but because they require investment
and the savings generated are not “cashable”,
they do not receive the consideration they
deserve. 
Boston Case
While providing social activities such as
sports and recreation is important, Boston
has done well to create a programme that
offers employment training and job place-
ment. Youth Opportunity Unlimited Boston
(known as YOU Boston) provides an inten-
sive case management service that includes
support, counselling and referrals to educa-
tion, housing, childcare, substance abuse
services, and other services a young person
might need. 
YOU Boston is built on a tiered system to
ease participants into training and eventually
get them into a job placement. The pro-
gramme targets at-risk youths to change the
way they think about their behaviour and
how they interact with people, effectively
teaching them how to interact with col-
leagues in the workplace. 
It serves mostly young people aged 14 to
24 years who have been involved with the
courts. The average age of active clients
involved is 20.4 years and the average age at
intake is 17.5 years. 80% of clients are male
and 84% are black; 14% are Latino; 2% are
white; and 1% Asian. 65% test below the
sixth-grade reading level. More than 75% are
affiliated to a gang and 95% are involved
with the courts.187
Juvenile probation accounts for 19% of
referrals, adult probation 21%, Department
of Youth Service 30%, and H ouse of
Corrections and others account for another
30%. Other referrals may come from the
Youth Service Providers Network, alternative
education programmes, street workers,
Boston police or the city’s Department of
Social Services.
The YOU Boston team has 16 full-time
case managers and a career development
team. The programme balances counselling
with career development. Transitional
employment services work in a phased
approach of three levels: pre-placement,
bridge internship and individual placement. 
After an evaluation at intake, case man-
agers must continue to think holistically
about the development and circumstance of
each youth. They must be aware of the level
of education, what a youth’s family situation
is like, the state of their work situation and
the relationship between a youth and their
supervisor. Most programme participants
will be assigned to the job readiness training.
Many individuals have extremely poor com-
munication skills when they enter the pro-
gramme. At intake stage most are unable to
make a business related phone call and are
unable to understand the difference between
talking to friends and talking to a job super-
visor.188 They lack conflict resolution skills
and cannot respond appropriately to author-
ity in a work environment.189 Development
of these soft skills is a crucial part of the pre-
placement curriculum. 
During the pre-placement workshops,
participants receive a minimum wage and
must demonstrate a willingness to work
through attendance, attitude and effort.190
Pre-placement training lasts two weeks, with
a two-and-a-half-hour session every day. The
sessions include interactive training, role play,
games, team building, small group work and
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190 Youth Opportunity of Boston
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individual reflection. There is a daily points
system and training evaluation to track the
progress of participants.
After successful completion of the pre-
placement level, participants are placed with
agencies and community-based organisations
in a group internship called the bridge pro-
gramme, subsidised by YOU Boston. Bridge
placements pay a subsidised wage of $8 per
hour. The bridge programme can last
between six weeks and six months and is a
team-based experience. Each participant
works five hours a day and must stick to a
structured daily curriculum to reflect real
work experience and skill development.191
Bridge programme projects are completed
within a team and recent work is varied, but
it always serves the community in some way.
One team completed an inventory of dona-
tions, food pantry operation, cooking and
serving in the kitchen and general mainte-
nance for a homeless shelter. Another project
cleaned and helped to refurbish a high school
during the summer.192
Following graduation from the bridge
programme, participants are assigned an
individual placement with a community-
based partner organisation for three to six
months. As with the bridge stage, youths
work five hours a day and must demonstrate
ability to work independently, communicate
effectively and handle themselves profession-
ally.193 Case managers continue to see partici-
pants on a weekly basis and carry out month-
ly evaluations. 
In this stage, case managers will emphasise
the amount of training and development
work that the participant has had. Figure 9
outlines the process.
In addition to employment services, YOU
Boston works to connect youth to education
services and opportunities. There is an excel-
lent alternative education network that YOU
Boston works with regularly. However, alter-
native education places can be expensive –
the organisation spends approximately
$650,000 per year on alternative education
places for programme participants. Other
educational options include a GED (high
school diploma equivalent) training pro-
gramme on site. YOU Boston also offers
higher education counselling and support for
those who want to access post-secondary
school education. From March 2008, YOU
Boston started a vocational training pro-
gramme in partnership with the Department
of Youth Service and Boston Police
Department. 
When YOU Boston was founded, it was
given a federal grant of $5,000,000 from the
Department of Labour. However, the federal
grant expired in 2005, and funding has been
halved.194 The annual operational budget for
YOU Boston is now $2.3 million, but the
cut in funding has meant that the organisa-
tion lost half its staff. Eligibility criteria for
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Figure 9: YOU Boston process
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participants have had to be prioritised and
the programme now focuses on the most
high-risk youths, who are almost all involved
with the courts.195
Funding now comes from several sources:
50% is collected from a state level grant, 35%
comes from the Mayor’s office and 15% from
charitable giving.196 The organisation has
recently acquired charitable status, which
makes securing philanthropic funds much
easier, although it still faces a financial short-
fall. 
Broken down to the participant level, the
annual cost of putting an individual through
the programme is about $4,000. If a pro-
gramme participant requires an alternative
education placement, then costs could run
closer to $10,000 a year. However, the aver-
age cost of incarcerating someone is $24,000
a year.197 Success is most often measured in
the retention rate, meaning that participants
are working, in education, or involved in
vocational training. Currently the retention
rate stands at 79%. Given that all pro-
gramme participants are extremely high
risk and 95% have criminal records, such a
high retention rate suggests that YOU
Boston is working. 
Offender Management
Boston Case
The partnership between Boston Police and
the Suffolk County Probation Service is
extremely well developed. Information shar-
ing and joint operations between the BPD
and the Suffolk County Probation Service
have been an integral part of the “pulling
levers” strategy in Boston. As a host of stake-
holders has worked to change the excepted
norms in Boston’s most challenging neigh-
bourhoods, the police and probation service
have worked to keep offenders from slipping
into recidivism. 
The most intensive programme in the
BPD/probation service partnership is
Operation Nightlight – which works closely
with the Youth Violence Strike Force. It aims
to prevent probationers who have been
involved with gangs and committed violent
crimes from re-offending or being victimised.
As its name implies, Operation Nightlight is
most active between 7.00 pm and midnight,
the hours when probationers are most likely
to default on their restrictions and curfews.
The BPD and the probation service have
made more than 500 visits to probationers
and spread the word that the police will not
tolerate the breaking of probation condi-
tions, making re-offending more difficult.198
Police and community partners have
evaluated Operation Nightlight and given
it credit for an almost 200% increase in
probation compliance and thus has
reduced recidivism.199 Given the high-risk
targets of Operation Nightlight, this figure
marks a significant return from investing
in the programme.
The Boston Re-entry Initiative (BRI) is
another programme aimed at dealing with
the most high-risk and violence prone
offenders after release from prison. The
BRI recognises that the highest risk
offenders are more likely to re-engage in
gang and gun violence unless they are
offered comprehensive help to change
their lives.200
The BRI starts working with offenders at
195 Interview with Kimberly
Pettetreau, Youth Opportunity
Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008
196 Interview with Kimberly
Pettetreau, Youth Opportunity
Boston, Boston, MA, July 2008
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Boston Globe, 13th October
2008; www.boston.com/news
/nation/articles/2008/10/13/us_p
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198 Boston Police Department,
Bureau of Field Services/Field
Support Division, 2007 Annual
Report, Boston, MA: BPD, 2008
199 Boston Police Department,
Bureau of field Services/Field
Support Division, 2007 Annual
Report, Boston, MA: BPD, 2008
200 City of Boston’s
Comprehensive Strategy to
Address Youth Gang and Gun
Violence, Year Three, Boston,
MA: Boston Police Department,
4 September 2008.
Lessons − Opportunities Provision
Given the importance of providing
job training, education, and employ-
ment opportunities to youth in high-
risk areas, local councils need to
make programmes like YOU Boston
a priority. They require considerable
investment but the potential savings
are significant. There is scope for
third sector provision of such a pro-
gramme, with a well defined role for
the police service in its implementa-
tion. YOU Boston is able to reach the
most at-risk youths because of its
relationship with police and the crimi-
nal justice system. 
the beginning of their sentences. It targets
the ‘impact players’ associated with gang
activity, violence and firearms crime.201
Boston Police Department lists the cost of
the BRI as $279,676 a year. This covers two
BRI mentors, two case managers and one
assistant re-entry co-ordinator. It is difficult
to calculate the total potential savings, but if
the initiative keeps just 12 offenders a year
from re-offending, the programme has
more than paid for itself.  
Results
The timing of each of these four cities’ strate-
gies, and their experiences of violent crime,
vary. Some of their approaches to violent
crime were similar and some unique. As
result it is difficult to draw comparisons
between their rates of violent crime. We can,
however, reasonably compare the situation
within each city over time. 
Boston
From 1970, violent crime began to pick up
rapidly in the city, reaching a peak in the
early 1980s and levelling off until the mid
1990s. Figure 10 gives the violent crime
trends for the city over the last 17 years.
Boston’s Gun Project and Operation
Ceasefire, in particular, have been held up
around the world as examples in how to
reduce violent crime and its “pulling levers”
strategy has been the focus of extensive aca-
demic research.202
The Boston “miracle” went beyond tra-
ditional policing and brought together a
range of government service providers,
community leaders and third sector organ-
isations as partners in public safety, and the
results are telling. From 1970, violent
crime began to pick up rapidly in the city,
reaching a peak in the early 1980s and lev-
elling off until the mid 1990s. As the case
study describes, a broad range of actors and
stakeholders took an active role in the
efforts to reduce violent gun and knife
crime. Moreover, different groups took
action at different times. As a result, it is
difficult to distinguish the impact of any
one programme, but overall statistics do
indicate the effectiveness of Boston’s efforts
as a whole. Figure 11 charts the number of
homicides in the city a year. The trend fol-
lows the same pattern as that for violent
crime as a whole, though year-on-year,
swings are more pronounced. 
A number of American cities have tried to
replicate Boston’s approach, especially target-
ing police patrols at violent crime hotspots,
with varying success. Operation Ceasefire,
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Lessons − Offender
Management
Governance structures for the British
criminal justice system fail to provide
adequate accountability for partner-
ship working between police and
other agencies. Boston’s Operation
Nightlight is a good example of two
crime and justice agencies working in
concert for the common cause of vio-
lent crime reduction. The BRI also
illustrates the need to expand the use
of multi-agency public protection
arrangements (MAPPA) in England
and Wales for violent gun and knife
crime offenders. Better offender man-
agement, inside prisons and upon
release, have potential to yield both
short and long-term reductions in vio-
lent gun and knife crime. The rate of
recidivism, currently higher than 60%,
is a blight on the British criminal jus-
tice system. Although prevention
strategies need to focus on children
and youth, better management of
offenders should be part and parcel
of any violent crime reduction strate-
gy. Prison offers an obvious venue to
reach gun and knife crime offenders,
and following their release from cus-
tody, these offenders should be given
tailored support and held to strict
release conditions.
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which began in 1995, benefited from
groundwork laid by community outreach
work and had an immediate impact.203 A
similar programme rolled out in
Indianapolis and evaluated in 2006 result-
ed in a statistically significant decline in
homicide rates.204 These findings support-
ed those of other research: police interven-
tions do reduce firearms crime.205
Both graphs show violent crime and
homicides falling from the early 1990s
through to 2004, when violent crime levels
were at 30 year lows and homicide levels
were at or near historical lows. Although
the figures have risen recently, this slight
upturn can be interpreted as a regression
towards the mean. Violent crime is still
50% below the level experienced in 1990. 
However there was a spike in homicides
(and non-fatal shootings) in 2005 and
2006, which coincided with reductions in
funding for a number of Boston preven-
tion programmes like YOU Boston and
YSPN. It is outside of the scope of this
study to test whether the two are correlat-
ed statistically. On the one hand, the
reduction in prevention funding, discussed
early in the report, was followed by a spike
in violent crime. On the other, violent
crime and homicides in Boston from the
203 Braga A, Kennedy D, Waring
E, and Piehl A, “Problem-orient-
ed policing, deterrence, and
youth violence: An evaluation of
Boston’s operation ceasefire”,
Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency, vol 38, pp
195-226, 2001
204 McGarrell E, Chermak S,
Wilson J and Corsaro N,
“Reducing homicide through a
‘lever-pulling’ strategy”, Justice
Quarterly, vol 23, no 2, pp 214-
231, 2006
205 Cohen J and Ludwig J,
“Policing crime guns”, in Ludwig
J and Cook P (eds), Evaluating
Gun Policy, Washington, DC:
Brookings, pp 217-250, 2003
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Figure 10: Levels of violence crime in Boston 1997-2007
late 1990s and early 2000s rose from near
historic lows. A recent analysis has shown a
12% decrease in violent crime in the city’s
hotspots for the period October 2007 to
March 2008 compared to the same period
in the previous year. Increased access to
philanthropic funding and adjustment in
tactics from police both seem to have
proved effective.
Chicago
The Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
changed the nature of policing and com-
munity engagement in the city. Academics
evaluated its effects after ten years and their
findings have generally been positive.206
Raw data before 1998 was not available to
us, but summary reports on CAPS report-
ed a 19% reduction in violent crimes from
1992 to 1997.207 Moreover, the number of
victims of a serious crime fell by 39,000.208
The graph below charts the total number
of annual homicides in Chicago from
1990 to 2007. 
CAPS was rolled out across Chicago in
1994, and looking at Figure 12, 1994
marks the beginning of a 13-year fall in the
number of homicides. Chicago’s reliance
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Figure 13: Number of murders in Chicago each year by weapon type 1998-2007 
on intelligence-led deployment of police
into hotspot areas, combined community
engagement, has been accompanied by a
48% drop in total annual homicides. 
Figure 13 illustrates the reduction in
firearms homicides from 1998 to 2007.
Targeting resources in the most at-risk
areas has led to a 38% reduction in
firearms homicides from 1998 to 2007.
Violent crimes in general declined steadily
from 1998 to 2007, at a compound annu-
al rate of 5.3%.209 The total of violent
crimes recorded in 2007, 34,895, repre-
sents a ten year decline of 39% from the
56,746 recorded in 1998.210
Chicago also had promising results in
targeted outreach interventions. Figure 14
shows that gun crime fell further in the
neighbourhoods targeted by the CeaseFire
programme than in other parts of the city.
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Other evaluations also credit CeaseFire
with significant falls in shootings in its tar-
geted areas.211
The graph below shows that firearm dis-
charges in CeaseFire neighbourhoods
decreased at a greater rate than in compar-
ison neighbourhoods. The significance of
the differences speaks to the importance of
police tactics working in concert with well
defined and effective street outreach pro-
grammes.
The graphs below show the reduction in
shootings in CeaseFire communities com-
pared to the rest of Chicago. 
In 2006, homicides rose by 5% in
Chicago, but in CeaseFire zones they fell
by 22%. The effect was especially marked
in those Ceasfire zones which began in
2005 – there homicides fell by a combined
53%.212
Toronto
Toronto is the most difficult of the three
cities to evaluate, as gun crime did not
emerge as a public concern until 2005.
Toronto Police Service’s changes in strate-
gy are still being developed. Like Chicago,
Toronto has built its response on intelli-
gence-led deployment. Community
engagement has also been a priority, but
its diverse population speaking many lan-
guages makes this a far more daunting
undertaking than in Chicago. The
Toronto Police Service has to deal with
the challenges that come with an extreme-
ly diverse population, the most pro-
nounced of which is language. Given the
specific context of Toronto, The TPS
approach has been more about improving
relations between communities and police
than explicitly empowering communities
as the Chicago Alternative Policing
Strategy has. 
Building better relationships with
excluded communities has led to a 40%
reduction in violence since 2005. In one
targeted area, that drop is as high as 83%.
Firearms offences have also fallen; fewer
shootings occurred in 2007 than 2005.
Figure 17 shows the reduction in shootings
and gun crime victims.
Figure 18 shows the reduction in the
number of gun calls to police. The past
three years indicate that the city’s approach
is yielding results. The intelligence-led
Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention
Strategy, the resilience of rapid response
teams and targeted community engage-
ment are proving to be effective suppres-
sion tactics. 
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Figure 16: Reductions in shootings in CeaseFire and non-CeaseFire
zones, eight new communities, 2005-06
* Results are statistically significant: p<0.01
** Results are statistically significant with p<0.05
Communities are: Englewood, Brighton Park E, Garfield, Albany Park, Little Village, Austin, Grand Boulevard, Woodlawn
The impact of Chicago and Boston’s
efforts at reducing violent crime is appar-
ent in the crime trends in both cities.
Toronto, too, has shown improvements,
but its efforts are still under development
and it will take longer before a full evalua-
tion is possible. None of the above cities
provides a perfect solution to gun and
knife crime. Nor should any city take a
blueprint from another city and apply it
wholesale to its own unique context.
However, there are a number of valuable
policy ideas that should be applied widely.
The impact of Chicago and Boston’s vio-
lent crime reduction efforts are evidenced
in the crime trends in both cities. While
Toronto has shown gains, the city’s efforts
are still in the developmental stage and it
will take longer before a full evaluation is
viable.
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Reducing Supply 
Introduction
In Going Ballistic, the first research report of
this series, we recommended controlling illic-
it weapons through limiting importation of
ballistics material, introducing legislative
changes and changing police enforcement
tactics. As a result of our research in North
America and the Netherlands, for this second
report, the following section recommends
more far-reaching legal reform. It also dis-
cusses how co-operation and co-ordination
of institutions, both internationally and in
Britain, could help to limit the illicit supply
of firearms. 
It is inevitable that this section focuses on
firearms rather than knives. Knives are readily
available to those who wish to use them ille-
gally, so there are obvious limitations on what
can be usefully recommended from the per-
spective of supply. The law as it stands does
restrict the availability of certain potentially
lethal knives (such as flick knives, lock knives)
and the carrying of knives with blades longer
than 3 inches in public places. In addition,
restrictions on the sale of knives to under 18s
have been introduced. But ultimately, for
knife crime, we must concentrate on the
demand side factors. That said, it is worth
reiterating our proposal in Going Ballistic for a
thoroughgoing review of the complex legisla-
tion relating to the criminal use of knives.213
International context
The 2007 Small Arms Survey, compiled in
Geneva and carried out by researchers on the
ground around the world, illustrates the
extent of global gun supply. Its key findings
are:214
 Every year 530,000 to 580,000 small
arms are produced under licence or as
unlicensed copies (60% to 80% of total
production);
 Nation states acquiring original technol-
ogy far exceed those that “own” original
technology;
 Only 57% of weapons produced by
those acquiring technology are produced
under licence;
 There are 875 million civilian, law
enforcement and military firearms in the
world;
 75% (650 million) are owned by civil-
ians (270 million of these are in the US)
 60 states made “irresponsible” small
arms shipments to 36 countries in 2002
to 2004;
 Transparency among major small arms
exporters is poor in many countries;
 The least transparent are Bulgaria,
North Korea and South Africa.
Other sources indicate that eight million new
firearms, both legal and illegal, are manufac-
tured annually. The abuse of firearms pres-
ents problems in the West, notably in large
cities in North America and Western Europe,
particularly in Chicago, London and Paris, as
well as in conflict and post-conflict zones. So
while 300,000 people die each year as a result
of firearms related incidents in conflict or
post-conflict regions of Africa, southeast
Europe and southeast Asia, another 200,000
die as a result of incidents involving firearms
in other parts of the world including Europe
and North America.215
Possession of, and trade in, illegal
firearms has grown over the past 18 years,
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since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
There is a buoyant trade in illegal firearms
sourced from military arms dumps in cen-
tral and eastern Europe, central and south-
east Asia.216 Skilled gunsmiths, in Croatia
and Serbia are reported to be producing
substantial quantities of illegal firearms.
Many are subsequently smuggled into
Western Europe.217 Other sources of
firearms include the theft of weapons from
legal arms dealers; fraudulent arms dealers
who feed guns to criminals directly or indi-
rectly;218 the “sale” by military and police
personnel of firearms in war zones (note
for example the “loss” of 190,000
Kalashnikovs supplied by the US to the
police and army in Iraq);219 and arms deal-
ers selling on weapons purchased from
police and military stocks to illegitimate
sources (note the case of the British arms
dealer attempting to sell ex-SAS machine
guns to Iran, contrary to the arms embar-
go).220
International actions: the strategic level
Internationally, there has been a growing
recognition of the illicit firearms supply
problem. In 1998, The UN General
Assembly convened a conference on the
small arms trade, after which a preparatory
committee was set up. In 2000, after lob-
bying pressure, it committed to combating
the illegal small arms (the third protocol)
at the Palermo Convention on transna-
tional crime. This was followed a year later
by a UN programme of action that
encouraged updates to legislation;
improved training of police and customs;
and destruction of some weapons and
weapons surrenders. 
An outline of these international interven-
tions is set out in table 5.
Despite the progress outlined in Table 5,
there has been a failure to “co-ordinate the
fight against the illegal arms trade at the cen-
tral level in most countries”. Moreover, there
has been failure to “contribute sufficient staff
and resources in cross-border co-operation to
effectively tackle illegal trafficking of
firearms.”221
A further shortcoming of the internation-
al convention and associated protocol in
practice is the absence of any recognition of
the role of police and customs in addressing
the production, distribution and possession
of illegal firearms.222 This is a staggering con-
clusion, and the reasons behind this are
twofold:
 The programme was designed from the
perspective of Foreign Affairs depart-
ments and humanitarian organisations. 
 Police services internationally have failed
to prioritise the trade in illegal firearms.
Police services do not feature in EU
policies on this issue, for example.223
In the UK, the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (specifically the arms trade unit and
counter-proliferation department) has the
lead on this issue. Consequently, any pro-
posed UN arms trade treaty would fall under
the remit of the Foreign Office – leaving the
Home Office conspicuously absent from the
process, despite its responsibility for policing.
Given the “local” consequences and the intel-
ligence role of policing, excluding the Home
Office from the process of curbing illicit arms
trade seems self-defeating.
The third protocol
The purpose of the third protocol on the
illegal production and trade in firearms
was to:
 Reinforce co-operation between states in
relation to the illegal trade and produc-
tion of firearms;
 Reinforce co-operation between states
on the investigation and prosecution of
transnational criminals and those
involved in organised crime groups;
 Make provisions to penalise the illegal
production and trade of weapons;
 Make provisions for the identification
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Table 5: Protocols and agreements on transnational trafficking of firearms
and registration of weapons, and their
import and export;
 Make provisions for regulation of arms
dealers activities;
 Make  provisions for settling disagree-
ments between states.224
Interestingly, the primacy of Foreign Affairs
departments over these issues contradicts
articles 11 through 14 of the third protocol,
which calls for police involvement, in that
they require:
 Investment in police control (with or
without customs) of the import, trans-
fer and export of weapons and in the
transnational co-operation between
these services;
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Date
15th November 2000
Came into force 29th Sept 2003
July 2001
Went live in 2005
31st May 2001
Came into force 3rd July 2005
12th July 2006
14th November 2006
October 2007
Instrument 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime (the
Palermo Convention)
General Assembly Resolution 55/25
Programme of Action for the Palermo Convention
Protocol to the Palermo Convention on the Illicit
Manufacturing and Trafficking of firearms, their components,
and ammunition (the third protocol)
Adopted by General Assembly resolution
Report of the UN conference to review progress in the
implementation of the programme of action
UN General assembly: A/conf. 192/2006/rc/9
UN resolution on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
UN, General Assembly, first committee, 61st session,
A/61/394: general and complete disarmament
UN General Assembly first committee (disarmament and
international security): tasked experts to formulate a draft
ATT for discussion in 2008 
Description
This is an international instrument
which was opened for signature at a conference in Palermo,
Italy in December 2000
This is the last of three protocols added to the Palermo con-
vention. This is the first legally binding instrument at a global
level on the issue of small arms. It is intended to promote,
facilitate and strengthen co-operation between states to pre-
vent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture and traffick-
ing in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition. 
States must be party to the Palermo convention before
becoming a party to any of the protocols. States that ratify the
protocol (as the UK has done) must commit to three so called
normative provisions in their domestic and legal arrangements,
namely:
1) establishing criminal offences concerning the illegal man-
ufacture of, and trafficking in, firearms;
2) system or systems of government licensing and authori-
sation which ensures legitimate manufacturing and traf-
ficking in firearms;
3) systems and arrangements to address the tracing and
marking of firearms
A progress report on the programme of action which
describes progress as disappointing
Adopted by 139 States (including the UK), with one rejection
(the US) and 24 not voting (including Russia, and many states
in the Middle East and East Asia)
In the UK, this is the responsibility of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office through its arms trade unit and counter-
proliferation department. We understand that the Foreign
Secretary chaired a meeting on the progress of the ATT in
September 2008
224 UN General assembly,
A/RES/55/255, ‘Resolution
adopted by the General assem-
bly: Protocol Againt the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, supplementing the
UN Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime
8th June 2001 New York: United
Nations
 Exchange of information on criminal
organisations involved in the illegal
arms trade;
 Sharing of technical and scientific
expertise to combat illegal weapons
production and trade;
 Mutual assistance in tracing trading
routes and in adequately responding
to requests for legal assistance;
 Appointment of liaison agencies at a
national level;
 Co-operation with legal weapons pro-
ducers in the fight against the illegal
trade;
 Provision of training and technical
support to parties to the protocol.225
We do not believe commitments made in
line with this protocol can be met “if
there are no requirements in place for the
organisation and staffing of police servic-
es, (centrally provided by Government)
to support it”226 – a point we shall return
to in the context of the arrangements in
the UK. This is a recurring theme, and
Going Ballistic made recommendations
concerning the failure of central govern-
ment to provide for the continued fund-
ing of the National Ballistics Intelligence
Service and the National Firearms
Intelligence Cell. This gap in funding is
leading to what is essentially an ad hoc
intervention by the Association of Chief
Police Officers to maintain these essential
services.227
In July 2001 the programme of action
to deliver the third protocol was adopt-
ed.228 National targets and measures were
set out in relation to:
 Measures used in the fight against the
illegal trade in small arms and light
weapons (including criminal intelli-
gence development, management of
confiscated weapons, development of
transnational co-operation in identifi-
cation and investigations relating to
the illegal firearms trade).
 Co-operation and assistance in the
implementation of the programme of
action (including assisting states that
require it in delivering the plan, devel-
oping policing systems, training and
exchange of experience; using technol-
ogy such as the Interpol weapons and
explosives tracking system and other
databases; and using existing forms of
international co-operation, police and
judicial in investigating and prosecut-
ing illegal firearms dealers).229
The implementation of the action plan,
however, has been described as “flawed” by
some professional observers.230 A report to
a UN conference on 12th July 2006 found
that “progress to date is only marginally
more encouraging and remains disappoint-
ing in many areas. Overall implementation
of the programme of action has been
mixed globally, regionally, nationally, and
thematically.”231
Towards an Arms Trade Treaty?
Perhaps in response to criticisms, there has
been increasing pressure for the develop-
ment of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to
provide for universal standards to guide the
arms trade – effectively “a legally binding
international agreement establishing a set
of basic rules to regulate the international
transfer of conventional weapons”.232
A UN resolution in this regard was
adopted on 14th November 2006 by 139
States, with one rejecting the ATT (the
United States) and 24 not voting (includ-
ing Russia and many states in the Middle
East and East Asia).233
In October 2007, the UN General
Assembly’s first committee (disarmament
and international security) asked experts to
formulate a draft treaty for discussion in
2008. The British Government apparently
supports an ATT.234 The lead rests with the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
we understand that the Foreign Secretary
David Miliband has in September 2008
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chaired a meeting on the progress of the
ATT.
In addition to obvious concerns about
the slow progress of international action
and of states (including the UK) in sup-
porting the principles of the third protocol
– we raise the point made earlier that this
is a cross-departmental issue. For police
and customs officers there is a local and
practical dimension to any arms trade
treaty, as well as a global one from the
FCO perspective.
The European Union
Within the EU there were some successes
in relation to the UN programme of
action. Most member states passed some
legislation to support implementation
(arms legislation in Europe, as indicated
earlier, is, with some exceptions, tight235);
and also took action with respect to third
world countries.236
Within the EU there are already a num-
ber of relevant arrangements, which
include:
 The Schengen Agreement 1995237 and
the Schengen Implementation
Convention of 1990, in particular arti-
cles 77-91 on the acquisition, possession
and sale of firearms and ammunition.238
The context was the abolition of bor-
der controls required enhancing of
measures in relation to firearms. A
report on the directive underpinning
this element of Schengen however,
recognised the problems of differ-
ences in legislation and registration
arrangements between states, making
information exchange about firearms
difficult; it commented also that
states “failed to perform as
required”.239
 A directive amending EU directive
(Schengen) in the light of the third pro-
tocol.240
This amendment proposal submitted in
2003, was focused upon dealing with
the illegal arms trade; setting up registra-
tion systems in member states to sup-
port simple tracing and identification of
weapons; putting in measures to ensure
integrity of arms traders and penalties in
legislation aimed at illegal firearms pro-
duction, trade and adaptation of
firearms. It was only on 16th April 2008
that member states (excluding Austria)
voted in favour of these amendments.241
The extremely slow progress out-
lined in relation to the third protocol,
therefore, is reflected at European as
well as at international level.
Firearms supply – the UK context
Firearms supply and legislation in the UK
The Firearms Act 1968, the primary source
of firearms law, is 40 years old. In Going
Ballistic, we made the case for a thorough-
going review of the legislation. The firearms
and licensing working group (FELWG) of
the Association of Chief Police Officers
(chaired by Assistant Chief Constable
Whiting, Dorset Police), has long argued
the need for a root-and-branch review of
firearms legislation. The working group
consists of firearms, explosives and licensing
experts (not just derived from police forces),
whose role is to determine operational poli-
cy, provide advice and work with practition-
ers on the interpretation of policy in relation
to firearms management and licensing. In
2004, the group submitted 70 recommen-
dations for changes in the law, with detailed
justification, to the Home Office (See
Appendix 4).242
The seven underlying principles of its
submission were:
1. Public safety
2. Countering illegal possession and crim-
inal use
3. Standard criteria for assessment of fit-
ness to possess firearms
4. Standard criteria for possession of all
firearms with potential lethality
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5. Flexibility to respond to potentially
dangerous developments in firearms
technology
6. Simplicity and ease of administration at
no net cost to public funds
7. No undue restriction on the legitimate
occupational or recreational use of
firearms
Some piecemeal changes have since been
introduced in response to events, however
the fundamental reform that ACPO
sought has not materialised.243 Two recent
criminal prosecutions have highlighted
the consequences of not reforming the
law.
Regina v Shepherd (Operation Mokpo)
Operation Mokpo began 18 months after
a series of shootings in North London.244
On 13th September 2006, Detectives from
Operation Trident raided the home of
David Shepherd in Dartford, Kent.245 This
raid was co-ordinated with raids by agents
from the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives in New Jersey.
Police were looking for evidence of
weapons smuggling, gun trafficking and
supply of weapons to drugs gangs. 
The evidence against Shepherd, includ-
ing that derived from a sting operation in
which undercover officers discussed the
purchase of weapons with him, (including
a Belgian revolver, a French service
revolver, a Smith and Wesson altered to fire
Russia military issue bullets and a British
Bulldog pistol).246 These firearms were all
advertised on Shepherd’s website.
Shepherd was a licensed firearms dealer
and his website had more than 250,000
visitors. He  claimed he had one of the
largest weapons collections in Britain, with
850 modern and antique weapons for
sale.247
The officer leading the raid, Detective
Superintendent Kevin Davis, was quoted
as saying “hundreds and hundreds of
weapons were found”, and that “it’s proba-
bly the biggest seizure of firearms that
Operation Trident has had since its con-
ception”.248 Around 900 guns were confis-
cated. 
Most were rifles and shotguns, they were
legal because Shepherd had been licensed
by Kent Police as a registered firearms deal-
er. There were also handguns that were
banned from sale unless, under the current
firearms legislation, “they were antiques for
display only”.
Shepherd was subsequently prosecuted
on 13 firearms charges. Nine months after
the raid he was acquitted of all charges, his
defence being based on the antique
firearms exemption in the 1968 Firearms
Act (s58 allows for the sale of certain
weapons as “curiosities or ornaments”).
The prosecuting barrister told the jury: “If
an individual has a genuine Wild West
type revolver…in a display case above the
mantelpiece…with no intention of doing
anything untoward with it – then it will
fall within the exemption. If however the
individual takes the same revolver out of its
display case and uses it to commit an
armed bank robbery then the exemption
does not apply…because it is no longer
being possessed as a curiosity or orna-
ment.”249
The antique weapon exemption, howev-
er, is vague – section 58 provides no defini-
tion of “antique” – it is for the courts to
determine on the merits of each case. Such
guidance that is available suggests that
“antique” weapons include “flintlocks,
muzzle loading guns and anything of obso-
lete calibre” (ie a cartridge type that is no
longer manufactured). 
Regina v Wilkinson
From 2004 to 2007, Grant Wilkinson was
part of a conspiracy to convert blank firing
replica Mac-10 sub-machine guns into
weapons capable of firing live ammuni-
tion; and was then involved in a conspira-
cy to move those weapons through a sup-
ply chain to criminal gangs. Wilkinson
purchased 90 replica guns from a legiti-
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mate outlet on the pretext that they were
for a Bond film. He converted sheds in his
property in Reading into a workshop and a
test firing room, where he proceeded to
convert the replicas into lethal firearms.
Thirty-nine were recovered by police in
other operations; and 51 shootings
involved the converted Mac 10s. Between
30 and 40 of these weapons have still to be
recovered. Although realistic imitation
firearms, such as Wilkinson bought, were
banned under the Violent Crime
Reduction Act 2006, it is not illegal to buy
deactivated guns, which can be converted
into live weapons.250 The Home Secretary
indicated at the beginning of 2008 plans to
ban these types of guns, plans which are
still being considered.251
Wilkinson was found guilty. He
received life imprisonment on four out of
nine counts (possession of firearms with
intent to endanger life and possession of
ammunition with intent to endanger life).
The difficulties for the prosecution
involved in proving intent were overcome
in these extreme circumstances. Maximum
sentences (five years only) were applied for
counts of conspiracy to sell or transfer
firearms and conspiracy to sell ammuni-
tion. Had he been found guilty on these
counts only the court would have been
severely limited in its sentencing powers,
and the public would not have been pro-
tected from the risk that Wilkinson posed
for long. The level of sentencing in
firearms cases is urgently in need of review
– a view shared by the sentencing judge.252
Meanwhile the anomaly in law regarding
deactivated weapons remains.253
These cases highlight some of the
shortcomings in firearms legislation.
Legal loopholes continue to exist as a con-
sequence of the Government’s failure to
review, or act promptly on, repeated rec-
ommendations to change firearms legisla-
tion. Consistent failure by Government
to respond to demands for a thorough
going review of firearms statutes over the
last four years clearly does nothing to
enhance public safety in the context of
modern gun related criminality – at least
on the basis of the cases cited here. And
arguably such failures are inconsistent
with the Governments’ obligations within
the third protocol, specifically its under-
takings in relation to criminal legislation
concerning the illegal manufacture and
trafficking of firearms.
Firearms supply and firearms tracing
The UK legislative regime regarding
firearms is an important aspect of control-
ling gun crime, but the enforcement of
these statutes – in particular the investiga-
tive and preventative capabilities provided
by firearms tracing – is the other side of the
coin. Once again, it is important to refer
back to the UK’s obligations and commit-
ments as a signatory to the Palermo conven-
tion and the third protocol, discussed earli-
er in this report. Both of these agreements
specifically refer to the obligation of signa-
tory states, in one of its ‘normative’ provi-
sions, to commit to systems and procedures
for marking and tracing firearms. A narrow
interpretation of their wording will not be
sufficient if further inroads are to be made
into the illicit supply of firearms.
A national firearms tracing service
(NFTS) for England and Wales was estab-
lished in April 2001, as part of the then
National Criminal Intelligence Service
(NCIS).254 It was a “response to the then
perceived increase in armed criminality
and recognition that there was no central
point within the UK for the collation of
intelligence regarding weapons seizures
and recoveries on a national basis”.255
The primary aims of the tracing service
“were to co-ordinate requests from within
the UK to trace firearms recovered from
crime within the UK for UK police forces,
and to receive and allocate similar tracing
requests from law enforcement agencies
overseas”. Before the creation of the tracing
service in 2001, requests from within the
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UK had been conducted on an ad hoc basis
by Interpol’ s desk within NCIS.256
Effectively what was being developed
was a national contact point for “recovered
firearms intelligence”. Ho wever, this
embryonic initiative faltered in April 2006
when the Serious and Organised Crime
Agency was created. It did not see firearms
supply at that time as a priority,257 even
though a report by the Inspectorate of
Constabulary, “Guns and Community”
had recommended that police forces make
greater use of the tracing service.258
This is not to say that the NFTS, when
active, was particularly effective – com-
ments include it was “at best slow”, or, “fre-
quently there was no response to the
request, or it was so slow as to be of little
or no use”. UK police forces often made
their investigation/inquiry directly to
police forces and agencies abroad.259 There
have been a number of positive develop-
ments, however. The national firearms
licensing management system has been
developed to provide police forces in
England and Wales with a database con-
taining details of all licence holders and
any weapon owned/registered to them.260
In addition, an ACPO/Home Office
funded initiative established the national
ballistics intelligence system, and a multi-
agency national firearms intelligence cell
(NFIC), which is well positioned to take
over the functions of the firearms tracing
service. Through its working group on the
criminal use of firearms, ACPO has
addressed the intelligence gap domestically
–though in the absence of continuing gov-
ernment funding.
With respect to firearms tracing across
the EU, Europol’s role is both to “gather
and develop intelligence for member states
in respect of all EU inter-member state
firearms tracing requests”. However, in
practice there seems to be “confusion
between Europol and EU member states as
to what Europol is looking to deliver to
member states with respect to firearms trac-
ing”.261 There are international relation-
ships, understandings and agreements that
require further development. The problems
that beset the tracing service under NCIS
are international in origin. For example
there is no control agreement or memoran-
dum of understanding with the receiv-
er/handler of international inquiries.262 The
many links in the chain of international
inquiries translate into delays and non-
responses – senior officers investigating seri-
ous crimes often have to use personal con-
tacts to get the information they require.263
There have been many missed opportunities
for co-ordinated intelligence and informa-
tion sharing. An obvious place to start
would be with a European-wide firearms
tracing agreement, with protocols systems
and structures to expedite international
inquiries. A police-led working group of
European firearms experts has drafted a
memorandum of understanding on firearms
tracing with EU member states.264 However,
to be effective, this needs high-level political
support and funding, and possibly legisla-
tion. This is another example of practition-
ers filling a gap in the absence of appropri-
ate action at government level. 
There are difficulties that practitioners
cannot reasonably be expected to overcome
– for example, the operating relationship
between Europol and Interpol, and the need
to obtain clarity and agreement on the
scope and nature of information exchange,
including compatibility of systems.265 This is
another area where the Government should
be engaged if it wants to curb the supply of
illegal firearms. Similarly the development
of high-level protocols beyond Europe, for
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“ The development of high-level protocols beyond
Europe, for example with the Department of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms in the US, would widen the scale
and effectiveness of tracing internationally”
example with the Department of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms in the US, would
widen the scale and effectiveness of tracing
internationally.266
Critical process issues within law
enforcement agencies in the UK remain to
be addressed. Going Ballistic commented
on the importance of key agencies co-oper-
ating effectively and this applies also to
work on firearms supply.267 But it is more
than just an issue of co-operation that is
relevant here: it is about effective informa-
tion handling. For example, when Revenue
and Customs seizes firearms, their compo-
nent parts or ammunition, it notifies a
department within the Metropolitan
Police, which passes on information to
police forces. However, “there is ambiguity
surrounding the subsequent action, or in
some cases apparent inaction, that is taken
in forces. Furthermore there is currently no
collation of data.”268 Thus, business
processes, as well as systems, require atten-
tion at police force level both nationally
and locally – the former in all probability
capable of being addressed by a properly
resourced NFIC; the latter being a respon-
sibility and priority within police forces. 
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Recommendations
The emerging theme from the case studies
and existing research on violent crime
reduction is one of repetition and reoccur-
ring findings. Research in the 1990s was
essentially advancing the same policy pre-
scriptions as research today. Thus the con-
clusions of this research publication are
neither unique nor groundbreaking; they
do, however, provide an updated account
of best practice in the reduction of violent
crime abroad. 
Which begs the question: why have the
policies that have been shown to work not
been implemented in England and Wales?
We believe that institutional structures in
both national and local government hin-
der an effective multi-agency strategy to
reduce violent crime. The setting up of
crime and disorder reduction partnerships
in 1998 was an encouraging development,
but interviews with senior police officers
revealed that some agencies are reluctant
participants, which is not helped by a lack
of clear lines of accountability for partici-
pants. This means that multi-agency work
on violent crime reduction is not occur-
ring as it should. Although outside the
scope of this report, the authors feel there
is an urgent need for further research into
governance and accountability arrange-
ments of agencies and local authorities at a
local level, recognising the intrinsic com-
plexity and implications for what might
amount to a constitutional reform. Dutch
local government arrangements and the
role of the burgemeester are very helpful; as
is the potential of the mayoral model in
London as the mayor takes on the role of
chair of the Metropolitan Police
Authority. 
The following recommendations have
been developed after careful consideration
of the case studies, review of existing
research, and consultation with senior
police officers in the Metropolitan Police.
The recommendations are divided into
two sections: supply and demand. The
supply-side recommendations concentrate
on dealing with illicit firearms supply in an
international context; the capacity to track
and investigate illegal firearms and their
criminal use. The demand-side recommen-
dations are built on a three-pronged strate-
gy of prevention, intervention and sup-
pression of violent gun and knife crime. 
Demand-Side Recommendations
Much is made of the potential for educa-
tional programmes in anger management
and conflict mediation in schools. The
Boston experience illustrates the usefulness
of a well defined anti-violence curriculum
in schools. However, such educational pro-
grammes in England and Wales are not
subject to rigorous evaluation or based on
best practice. According to a senior
Metropolitan Police officer no clear doc-
trine or best practice for anti-violence edu-
cation curriculum exists on a national
level. That is not to advocate a one-size-fits
all model should exist; however, most anti-
violence programmes in schools take place
on a one-off, ad hoc basis without a long-
term perspective. 
Recommendation 1:
 The Department for Children, Schools
and Families should – in partnership
with government departments – develop
and implement good practice guidelines
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“ We believe that institutional structures in both national
and local government hinder an effective multi-agency
strategy to reduce violent crime”
for an anti-violence curriculum in pri-
mary and secondary schools. 
A long-term, anti-violence curriculum
should incorporate modules explaining the
risks of carrying weapons and the damage
they do, anger management and conflict
resolution. At present, many anti-violence
educational efforts in schools are piecemeal
and short-term.
Recommendation 2:
 Police forces in urban centres, such as
London, Liverpool, Manchester and
Birmingham, should send dedicated
police officers into primary and sec-
ondary schools and further education
colleges in at-risk areas. Police should
have a role in delivering an anti-vio-
lence education curriculum in co-
operation with students. They will
have a chance to identify at-risk chil-
dren and youths at the earliest possible
age, intervening and channelling them
into available resources and services. 
Poor intelligence and information sharing
between schools and police is a pervasive
problem throughout England and Wales.
Some schools are more forthcoming and
co-operative with police than others. Many
school administrators fear being stigma-
tised when police get involved. Although
London police have a presence in some
secondary schools, this should only be a
first step towards a more complete engage-
ment. Meanwhile, further education col-
leges have become areas of concern for vio-
lence and police have no presence in fur-
ther education institutions. 
Recommendation 3:
 Mandatory jail sentences with respect
to gun and knife crime offending
should be applied as stated in the leg-
islation. This is an essential aspect of
communicating to potential offenders
that the use of firearms and knives will
not be tolerated, and that tough con-
sequences await those who refuse to
abide by this social norm.
As the authors argued in Going Ballistic,
mandatory sentences are not being carried
out as they were intended. Ministry of
Justice figures show that only 141 out of
281 people sentenced for possession of a
firearm in 2006 received the mandatory
minimum five years.269 There are indica-
tions that this is changing, which is
encouraging, but there must be a full com-
mitment to enforcing mandatory mini-
mum sentences for carrying weapons.
Much of Boston’s success in reducing seri-
ous youth violence lay in the city’s ability
to change social norms. The police let dan-
gerous members of the community know
that if they did not give up violent pur-
suits, the full force of the law would be
used to incarcerate them for as long as pos-
sible. If mandatory minimum sentences
are not implemented, it sends the wrong
message to violent offenders and potential
violent offenders.
Recommendation 4: 
 A legislative remedy to enable police to
ban high-risk individuals from specific
areas for a specified period of time.
Gangs and high-risk individuals, through
threatening behaviour, can impose virtual
“no-go” areas and a general sense of fear.
Without the power of carefully targeted civil
injunctions, gang activity can destroy civilised
living conditions for some communities.
Birmingham’s use of Section 222 of the Local
Government Act 1972 allowed police and
councils to combat gang activity and avert
potential violence. Simpler, more practical
and timely powers in this regard were used to
good effect in Amsterdam.
Recommendation 5: 
 Outreach work in high-risk areas
should be resourced and developed
www.policyexchange.org.uk •   57
Recommendations
269 Hope C, “Half of criminals
caught with guns escape mini-
mum jail term”, The Daily
Telegraph, 17th October, 2008
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news
topics/politics/lawandorder/
3216019/Half-of-criminals-
caught-with-guns-escape-mini-
mum-jail-term.html
according to best practice, and should
incorporate clinical, programme, and
street models.270
Outreach work throughout high-risk areas
in England and Wales, although com-
mendable, does not have a co-ordinated
approach or the structure to be as effective
as it could be. The Metropolitan Police
Authority’s violent crime reduction strate-
gy plans to make use of street pastors as
outreach workers, but this aspect of the
strategy remains ill-defined. Outreach
work is a crucial means of reaching hard to
contact, at-risk youth. Outreach workers
should be able to identify at-risk youth and
channel them into available services like
education, job-training, substance abuse
counselling etc. 
Recommendation 7:
 The Department of Health should
produce guidelines instructing hospi-
tals to share information on A&E
patients treated for violent crime.
Given the difficult nature of measuring
knife crime, policymakers need access to
every possible source of data. However,
neither the police nor the Home Office has
unfettered access to data and individual
information for victims of violent crime
receiving treatment. In Going Ballistic, we
outlined earlier research on the public
health approach to violent crime reduc-
tion, and the importance of incorporating
the health service into the fight against vio-
lence. The sharing of information would
be an important first step in bringing the
health service into the cause. 
Recommendation 8: 
 Children and youths treated for gun
and knife violence should receive
counselling by an outreach worker in
hospital, with follow-up after dis-
charge as part of a prevention focused
plan.
Victims of violent crime are up to 70%
more likely to become violent assailants
themselves, and yet there is no national
programme in place to offer trauma sup-
port and counselling to victims who
receive hospital treatment.271 Hospital
treatment for victims of violent crime
should be a point of intervention to curb
the likelihood of future violence.
Recommendation 9: 
 The prison service should implement
a targeted, properly resourced and
bespoke intervention programme for
offenders involved in gun, knife and
gang crime. This should be undertak-
en in partnership with police and the
Home Office.
Interventions to reduce future violent
crime must be put in place at every possi-
ble point of access. Boston has done well to
develop interventions and provide services
to violent offenders. Prisoner interventions
for gun and knife crime offenders have
been a mainstay of the city’s strategy for
reducing violent crime. In England and
Wales, however, there is lack of targeted
interventions in prisons for gun and knife
crime offenders. Gun and knife crime
offenders receive the same intervention
programmes as any other offender. 
Recommendation 10:
 Multi-agency public protection
arrangements (MAPPA) should be
extended across England and Wales to
manage violent ex-offenders and other
high-risk individuals effectively. 
These arrangements were originally
designed to manage the risks posed by sex
offenders after release. However, MAPPAs
are not being used to their full potential.
They should be used to ensure effective
and appropriate multi-agency manage-
ment of gun and knife offenders who may
pose a risk to society.
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270 See discussion of models
on page 66
271 Interview with senior repre-
sentative, Metropolitan Police,
London, October 2008.
Recommendation 11:
 Police in urban areas should regularly
review the membership of their inde-
pendent advisory groups to ensure
that they reflect communities. Police
need to ensure their engagement
strategies are sensitive to ethnic shifts.
The Toronto Police Service has done
an excellent job responding to a very
diverse community and police forces
in England and Wales could build on
the positive engagement work done in
Toronto.
Major urban centres across England and
Wales are undergoing an ever-shifting eth-
nic make-up. Shifting demographics has
had a subsequent impact on gangs and vio-
lent crime. However, police engagement
with the community, fails to account for
changing demographic trends. As a result,
police Independent Advisory Groups do
not necessarily represent the ethnic make-
up of the communities they are designed
serve.
Recommendation 12:
 Extend the multi-agency risk assess-
ment conferences to include victims of
serious gun and knife violence.272
Interviews with senior Metropolitan Police
officers revealed that victim counselling
from the police service often fails to extend
beyond the immediate family of victims.
Violent crime can inflict a heavy toll on
community members and there is a dearth
of immediate support and counselling
offered to its wider victims.
Recommendation 13:
 A stronger border force and more rigor-
ous screening of entrants into the UK
should be a priority. Successful adop-
tion of Boston’s “pulling levers” deter-
rence strategy should make use of all
available powers across agencies, includ-
ing immigration and passports offences.
Anecdotal evidence given in interviews
with police officers from urban centres in
England and the UK revealed that a signif-
icant amount of gun and knife crime is
being perpetrated by illegal immigrants.
Recommendation 14:
 There should be a statutory sanction
enshrined in legislation to underpin
the partnership duties set out in the
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and in
any other approved guidance (for
example, multi-agency public protec-
tion arrangements).
Information sharing outside of multi-
agency public protection arrangements and
prolific priority offenders was poor. Not all
partners were complying fully with the
information sharing guidance outlined in
the Crime and Disorder Act, and the impact
of this was that suitable interventions were
not being identified for young people in
need or at risk. On some occasions informa-
tion held about young people in need or at
risk was not utilised by other partners who
had a statutory duty to act on it.
Supply-Side Recommendations
As we argued in the supply-side section of
this report, there are significant shortcom-
ings in the capacity of the UK Borders
Agency to stop firearms being smuggled
into the country. Interviews with police
intelligence officers in several English cities
indicated problems with tackling the illicit
supply of firearms from abroad. There has
been a failure to contribute sufficient staff
and resources in cross-border co-operation
to tackle the illegal trafficking of firearms.
Recommendation 16:
 The Government should commit ded-
icated law enforcement resources on a
joint agency basis (eg Serious
Organised Crime Agency, police and
customs), directed specifically at devel-
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272 Multi-agency Risk
Assessment Conferences
(MARACs) involve police, proba-
tion, education, health, housing
and the voluntary sector, work-
ing together on an individual vic-
tim’s case. MARACs are current-
ly used for victims of domestic
violence, but there is potential
for expanding their use for gun
and knife crime
oping and delivering cross-border co-
operation in relation to the illegal traf-
ficking of firearms.
Recommendation 17:
 The Home office and ACPO should
be fully engaged in partnership with
the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) in developing the UK
response to these international arrange-
ments. It needs to be negotiated at the
appropriate level in government.
Cross-departmental co-operation can fall
down in any realm of government policy;
there has been a distinct lack of engagement
between the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Home Office in combating the
illicit international arms trade. The FCO –
through its arms trade unit and counter-
proliferation department – is directly
responsible but, given the local ramifica-
tions of illegal firearms and the intelligence
role of policing, the Home Office and the
police also need to be fully involved.
Recommendation 18:
 The Government should centrally
fund National Ballistics Intelligence
Service (NABIS) and National
Firearms Intelligence Cell (NFIC), to
ensure the future and continuity of
the programmes. Funding for both
would eventually pay for itself by sav-
ing investigation time.
The failure of central government to pro-
vide for the continued funding of the
national ballistics intelligence system and
the national firearms intelligence cell has
led the Association of Chief Police Officers
to maintain these essential services out of
their own budget in an ad hoc manner.
However, this is not a sustainable practice,
and it leaves the future of a crucial inves-
tigative tool insecure.
Recommendation 19:
 The legislation affecting both knife and
gun crime should be subject to a thor-
ough review with the object of simplifi-
cation and clarification. Such a review
should address the criticisms raised by
ACPO in 2004 (see Appendix 4); the
issues raised in recent high-profile cases
concerning deactivated, reactivated, and
antique weapons; and specific issues in
relation to manufacture and trafficking
of weapons in the light of the Palermo
Convention commitments.
Interviews carried out for this publication
have underlined the position taken in our
first report, Going Ballistic, that current leg-
islation governing firearms and offensive
weapons is not fit for purpose, being piece-
meal and incomplete. The Palermo
Convention, in particular its third proto-
col, which places general obligations on the
UK concerning its legislative regime
around firearms, has not been sufficiently
acted on. The Firearms Act 1968 is now 40
years old. Loopholes continue to exist as a
consequence of a failure to instigate a full
review of firearms and offensive weapons
legislation.
Recommendation 20:
 The illicit supply of firearms should be
made an explicit priority for ACPO,
Serious Organised Crime Agency and
Revenue and Customs. The
Government should take the lead in the
development and implementation of
international arrangements and agree-
ments for firearms tracing to support
investigations rather than, as now, leav-
ing the responsibility to practitioners.
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Appendix 1
Recommendations 
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Suppression
Recommendation 4 
(Supply Side):
The legislation affecting both knife
and gun crime should be subject
to a thorough review with the
object of simplification and clarifi-
cation. 
Recommendation 8 
(Demand Side):
A law to enable police to ban
high-risk individuals from specific
areas for a specified period of
time.
Recommendation 9 
(Demand Side):
There needs to be a clear carrot
and stick approach. In high risk
areas, deterrence should be sup-
ported by a clear message that
violence will not be tolerated; all
agencies to pull every lever legally
available when violence has
occurred.
Recommendation 17
(Supply Side):
The Home office and ACPO
should be fully engaged in part-
nership with the FCO in devel-
oping the UK response to these
international arrangements. It
needs to be negotiated at the
appropriate level in government.
Recommendation 20
(Supply Side):
The illicit supply of firearms
should be made an explicit priori-
ty for ACPO, Serious Organised
Crime Agency and Revenue and
Customs. The Government
should take the lead in the devel-
opment and implementation of
international arrangements and
agreements for firearms tracing
to support investigations rather
than, as now, leaving the respon-
sibility to practitioners.
Education
Recommendation 5 
(Demand Side):
The Department for Children,
Schools, and Families should
develop an anti-violence curricu-
lum for primary and secondary
schools.
Recommendation 6 
(Demand Side):
Police forces in urban centres
should send dedicated police offi-
cers into at-risk risk primary and
secondary schools, and further
education colleges. Police should
have a role in delivering an anti-
violence education curriculum in
co-operation with students. 
Social Intervention
Recommendation 9
(Demand Side): 
Outreach work in high-risk
areas should be resourced and
developed on the basis of
proven best practice.
Recommendation 12 
(Demand Side): 
Children and youths treated for
gun and knife injury should
receive counseling by an out-
reach worker in hospital with
follow-up after discharge, as
part of a prevention focused
evaluation and treatment plan 
Recommendation 15 
(Demand Side):
Police in urban areas should
carry out regular reviews of
membership of their IAGs to
ensure they reflect communi-
ties. Police forces in England
and Wales could follow the
example of the positive engage-
ment work done in Toronto. 
Community Mobilisation and
Multi-agency Approach
Recommendation 1 
(Supply Side):
The Government should deliver
cross-border co-operation in
relation to the illegal trafficking
of firearms. 
Recommendation 2 
(Supply Side):
The Home Office and ACPO
should be fully engaged in part-
nership with the FCO in devel-
oping the UK response to inter-
national arrangements for
cross-border co-operation. 
Recommendation 3 
(Supply Side):
The Government should fund
NABIS and NFIC centrally to
ensure the future of the pro-
grammes. This would eventually
pay for itself by saving investi-
gation time.
Recommendation 10
(Demand Side): 
Multi-agency public protection
arrangements (MAPPA) should
be extended across England
and Wales to manage violent
ex-offenders and other high-risk
individuals effectively. 
Recommendation 11 
(Demand Side):
The Department of Health
should produce guidelines
instructing hospitals to share
information on A&E patients
treated for violent crime.
Recommendation 19 
(Demand Side):
There should be a statutory
sanction enshrined to underpin
the duties set out in the Crime
and Disorder Act and in any
other approved guidance (eg
MAPPA)
Offender Management
Recommendation 7 
(Demand Side):
Mandatory jail sentences with
respect to gun and knife crime
offending should be applied as
stated in the legislation. This is
an essential aspect of communi-
cating to potential offenders that
the violent use of firearms and
knives will not be tolerated 
Recommendation 13 
(Demand Side): 
The Prison Service, in partner-
ship with police and the Home
Office, should implement a tar-
geted, resourced, and bespoke
intervention programme for
offenders involved in gun, knife
and gang crime. 
Recommendation 16 
(Demand Side):
Extend the MARACS to include
victims of serious gun and knife
violence.
Recommendation 18 
(Demand Side):
Sanctions should be applied rig-
orously where statutory duties
have not been complied with. 
Recommendation 14 
(Demand Side):
MAPPA should be extended
across England and Wales to
manage violent ex-offenders and
other high-risk individuals.
Appendix 2
Examples of Currently Running Programmes in London 
The Wave Trust/Barnardo’s (0-19)
The Wave Trust promotes work with high-risk families to identify children at risk from an early age, and family-based
interventions are being developed. It is also working with the London Safeguarding Children Board and Barnardo’s on
approaches to prevent child abuse through sexual exploitation.
MissDorothy.com (7-16)
This programme will support all secondary schools in London over the next three years, and primary schools in areas
of high priority. The website provides lessons on crime and its consequences, domestic violence, extremism, forced mar-
riage, drugs, alcohol, guns and knives, gangs and bullying.
Volunteer Police Cadets (VPC) and Project YOU (12-19)
The VPC is expanding and developing a partnership with other uniformed youth organisations across London through
Project YOU. This will offer young people exciting opportunities for gaining skills and active citizenship. 
Street Pastors (11-18)
This scheme has been set up by volunteers from the Ascension Trust. initially funded in 2007-08, it could be
expanded to make young people feel safer at the peak time of victimisation, 3-5pm as they leave school, and other
times when they are vulnerable.
The Prince’s Trust (13-18)
This will extend programmes into more secondary schools and to help school leavers in areas of high crime by provid-
ing music and other awards programmes.
Met-Track (11-18)
This is a programme offering 5,000 young people an opportunity to take up sport. The scheme was successfully pilot-
ed in the London Borough of Bexley in 2005, and has since expanded into five more boroughs. It now includes 15 bor-
oughs. 
Voyage Programme
This currently operates in the London boroughs involved in Operation Trident (Brent, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth,
Newham and Southwark) targeting gun crime among black youths. More than 3, 600 young people have taken part in
workshops. The National Black Police Association has also developed a programme, VOYAGE, to ensure that young
people are  listened to; it includes a leadership programme.
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Example of Activities Matrix from Boston
www.policyexchange.org.uk •   63
Suppression
 Intelligence collection
 Intelligence analysis
 Intelligence sharing and dis-
semination
 Co-ordination of intelligence
regionally with other law
enforcement agencies
 Development of strategy
based on intelligence
 Co-ordination of suppres-
sion strategies locally and
regionally
 Selection of highest risk
offenders for intervention
and suppression
 High visibility patrols and
saturation patrols
 Investigation
 Monitor offenders in pro-
gramming
 Swift enforcement as
required
 Collaborate with prosecution
Social Intervention
 Selection of participants for
intervention programming
 Referral of target groups to
programmes and services
 Co-ordination of and partici-
pation in panel presentations
to target groups
 Problem solving and youth
outreach in districts
 Filter and manage funds for
community agencies for
partnership programs
Opportunities Provision
 Selection of participants
for programming
 Referral of target groups
to programming
 Filter and manage funds
for community agencies
for partnership pro-
grammes
 Problem solving and youth
outreach in districts pro-
viding referrals to services
Organisational Change and
Development
 Development of Youth
Violence Strike Force to
focus on gangs
 Development of Safe
Street Teams into existing
district patrols to focus on
problem solving
 Development of Boston
Regional Intelligence
Center to facilitate sharing
of crime intelligence
 Participation in and co-
ordination of gang and
gun related task forces
and projects
 Development of gang
database, re-entry data-
base and various systems
 Utilise crime analysts and
technology to improve
intelligence collection and
analysis
 Include community and
faith-based partners in
development of program-
ming through close collab-
oration
 Infuse community policing
into everyday activities
and mission
Community Mobilisation
 Include community and
faith-based partners in
development of program-
ming through close collabo-
ration
 Development and participa-
tion in multi-jurisdictional
and multi-agency task
forces and programmes
Appendix 4
ACPO Recommendations for Changes to Firearms 
Legislation (2004)*
Part 1: Firearms
1.1 Devolve administration of section 5 firearms to police 
1.2 Remove gas, pepper sprays and stun guns from the Firearms Acts 
1.3 Agree with shooting associations which firearms are acceptable for which purpose 
1.4 Agree with appropriate body optimum calibre for handgun used for humane killing 
1.5 Restrict section 5 handguns to those requiring them for within their employment 
1.6 Retain period on loan without notification at 72 hours 
1.7 Exemption for pump action rifles in .22RF calibre extended to “rimfire up to .22 calibre”
1.8 Continue with three categories, section 1, 2 and 5 but administered on one certificate 
1.9 Good reason for shot guns is not progressed without further study and consultation 
1.10 A common standard be used in the assessment of fitness to possess all types of firearms 
1.11 There are no changes to current conditions on certificates 
1.12 Only the amount of ammunition authorised to be possessed need be recorded on the certificate 
1.13 There are no changes to current conditions on certificates 
1.14 Firearms not to be kept on unoccupied premises for prolonged periods 
1.15 Applicants to provide proof of identity 
1.16 The police to revoke any certificate or authority issued by them 
1.17 Amend subsections 48(1) and (2) to include civilian officers 
1.18 Investigate the possibility to charge a fee for an EFP 
1.19 Investigate the possibility to change the format for EFPs 
1.20 Power of entry for FEOs to inspect security 
1.21 Minimum standard of security to be specified on certificate 
1.22 Amend Firearms Rules so that all official forms conform to a common standard 
1.23 Like-for-like variations should not require authority to acquire/exchange 
1.24 No variations permitted within the first twelve months of a certificate 
1.25 No change is required to control or restrict the number of guns 
1.26 Applicants must be of exemplary character 
1.27 Sentence to a term of imprisonment, suspended or otherwise, prohibits possession of all firearm whether subject to
certification or not, for life. Application may be made for the prohibition to be removed. 
1.28 Certificates to be granted for up to three years
1.29 To continue co-operation with the BMA to improve the passage of medical information
1.30 Authority to suspend certificates for a given period.
1.31 Conduct study into the merits of mandatory training
1.32 Conduct study into the merits of third party insurance 
1.33 Adopt the definition of component part as given by the FCC 
1.34 Include component parts for shot guns on certificate 
1.35 Investigate improvement to line management of firearms licensing whether within the police service or outside it 
1.36 FCC to continue 
1.37 Repeal section 5A(4) (expanding ammunition) and amend Deer Act 
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* Derived from ACPO Submission to the Home Office for the Controls on Firearms (2004) London: ACPO (unpublished)
Part 2:  Unlicensed Guns 
2.1 Define all words which have specific meaning within the Acts 
2.2 Sale of imitation firearms remain unlicensed 
2.3 Air weapons to be sold by registered firearms dealers (RFDs) only 
2.4 All imported deactivated firearms and those brought in by visitors to be deactivated to 1995 standard 
2.5 Deactivated firearms are not subject to licensing 
2.6 Define antique 
2.7 Define lethality at one joule
Part 3: Young People and Guns 
3.1. The minimum age for a firearm or shot gun certificate is 14 years 
3.2 Between 14 and 17, the young person must be supervised (individually) by a person over 21 who has held a cer-
tificate for more than three years.
Part 4: Trade  
4.1 RFDs to be subject to same criteria as certificate holders for possession of firearms 
4.2 Period of registration should remain at three years
4.3 No change to inspections, can be regulated by best practice
4.4 Trading pending appeal against removal from the register is unlawful
4.5 Define servant or use employee
4.6 Details of all employees requires for police checks
4.7 Liaison with other agencies for further research regarding firearms in transit 
4.8 Review immunity provided by Section 96 of the Postal Services Act
Part 5: Ammunition 
5.1 Amend prescribed condition to make shot gun cartridges subject to security and consideration given to their pos-
session without a certificate unlawful
5.2 Production of certificates to purchase/acquire cartridges and component parts of ammunition 
5.3. Repeal section 5A(4) prohibiting expanding ammunition 
Part 6: Other Issues
6.1 Repeal section 11(4) for miniature rifle ranges 
6.2 Investigate distinction between theatrical performances and re-enactment 
6.3 Consider repealing section permitting prohibited firearms to be used for starting races
6.4 System of vetting or exemption for crown servants for companies managing firearms for the MoD 
6.5 Repeal exemption for those carrying/transporting firearms to/from Proof Houses. 
6.6 Resolve issue of between club location and secretary’s address 
6.7 List approved target disciplines 
6.8 Consider options to Crown Court Appeals
6.9 Requirement for British visitor’s permit remains unchanged 
6.10 Sponsors to be more accountable for their visitors. 
6.11 Define the following words in the Acts: 
Antique, artificial targets, carrier, historic interest, imitation, lethality, occupier, registered firearms dealer, renewal or re-
grant, replica, readily convertible, residence, small firearm, servant, (or use “employee”), supervision (qualifications,
experience or age required), trophies of war, use, variation one-for-one (or like-for-like). Clarify section 7(3) 
6.12 Improve technological terms 
6.13 Evaluate methodology to assess fees
6.14 Notification to include down rating of air weapons
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Since the first report in this series was published in July 2008, 
gun and knife crime has stubbornly remained in the headlines – 
and on the political agenda. Murder is always shocking; never 
more so than when both perpetrator and victim are young. 
Twenty-seven people were killed as a result of gun and knife 
crime on London’s streets in 2008 and 380 people in England 
and Wales as a whole. And there is a wider economic cost to 
this human loss. The economic cost of all murders with firearms 
amounted to more than £200 million. When murders with knives 
are included, the cost is approximately £628 million. The number 
of knife murders has increased by 23% over the past ten years; 
injuries caused by knives have increased by 30% from 1997, 
and police arrests for carrying a weapon with a blade or point 
in and near schools went up 500% from 1999 to 2005. Culprits 
are younger, and the fear that they spread is driving more young 
people to carry knives for self-protection.
 
Injuries and deaths from knives far outstrip those from firearms: 
knife crimes are four times more common than gun crimes; and 
the risk of serious injury is more than double that for gun crime. 
Guns are strictly regulated but restricting the supply of knives is 
impossible. So, what should the Government do?
 
Dr Bob Golding and Jonathan McClory build on the findings of 
their first report, and discuss four case studies from international 
cities that have successfully reduced violent gun and knife 
crime.
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